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Accommodating Every Body 
Michael Ashley Stein,† Anita Silvers,†† 
Bradley A. Areheart‡ & Leslie Pickering Francis‡‡ 
This Article contends that workplace accommodations should be predicated on 
need or effectiveness instead of group-identity status. It proposes that, in principle, 
“accommodating every body” be achieved by extending Americans with Disabilities 
Act–type reasonable accommodation to all work-capable members of the general 
population for whom accommodation is necessary to give them meaningful access. 
Doing so shifts the focus of accommodation disputes from the contentious identity-
based contours of “disabled” plaintiffs to the core issue of alleged discrimination. 
This proposal likewise avoids current problems associated with excluding “unwor-
thy” individuals from employment opportunity—people whose functional capacity 
does not comply with prevailing workforce design and organizational presump-
tions—and who therefore require accommodation. Adopting this proposal also re-
sponds to growing demands to extend the length of time people remain at work by 
enhancing employment opportunities for aging individuals still capable of contrib-
uting on the job. Provision of accommodations for age-related alteration of function-
ality, when the accommodations are effective, is reasonably prescribed because it is 
in everyone’s interest to retain maximum capabilities as they grow older, whether or 
not they also possess identity-based characteristics sufficient to constitute a “disabil-
ity” under the ADA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts have struggled for more than two decades with the 
question of who is entitled to a reasonable accommodation under 
the employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 19901 (ADA). Judges have found it difficult to reconcile the fine 
balance required by the statute that workers be sufficiently im-
paired to fall within the disability classification, yet remain capa-
ble of performing essential job functions with or without accom-
modations.2 The Supreme Court eschewed explicating these 
standards by imposing stringent requirements for being “an indi-
vidual with a disability” under the ADA, with the result that no 
 
 1 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
This remains true despite clarifications contained in the consolidating Americans with Disa-
bilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub L No 110-325, 122 Stat 3553, codified 
in various sections of Titles 29 and 42. 
 2 See, for example, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc v Williams, 534 US 
184, 199–203 (2002). See also 42 USC § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual”); 42 USC 
§ 12102(2) (defining “disability”).  
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employment-capable plaintiff claiming disability-based discrimi-
nation achieved victory at the Court.3 Following the Court’s ap-
proach, over 97 percent of ADA claimants in federal trial courts 
before 2010 also lost.4 
Ironically, it is precisely those potential employees with dis-
abilities—work-capable individuals denied access to the work-
place—that Congress intended to empower through the ADA.5 
Consequently, Congress responded to the Court’s restrictive ap-
proach with the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act 
of 20086 (ADAAA), rejecting the “demanding standard[s]” that 
courts imposed for a determination of disability.7 The ADAAA’s 
stipulation that disability is to “be construed in favor of broad cov-
erage of individuals”8 means that judges should now be reluctant 
to dismiss cases at summary judgment on the ground that plain-
tiffs’ impairments do not meet the statutory definition of disabil-
ity. Similarly, the ADAAA has the potential to shift attention 
from whether a person meets a threshold standard for disability 
to whether a person is capable of performing essential functions 
for a given position with or without an accommodation. Even with 
the ADAAA, however, courts may continue to struggle with bal-
ancing determinations of disability against determinations of 
ability to perform essential job functions with or without accom-
modations. Thus, the challenge of integrating disability status 
with work-capable status remains. 
The definition of disability in the ADA, and even more so in 
the ADAAA, is in tension with the Social Security Administra-
tion’s competing definition of disability as a complete inability to 
work,9 a binary view of disability and employability that reaches 
 
 3 Nathan Catchpole and Aaron Miller, Comment, The Disabled ADA: How a Nar-
rowing ADA Threatens to Exclude the Cognitively Disabled, 2006 BYU L Rev 1333, 1364. 
“The Court has invented a bizarre and deeply paradoxical requirement that a disabled 
individual must offer specific proof of her own negative ability.” Aviam Soifer, The Disa-
bility Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L Rev 1279, 1289 (2000). 
 4 See, for example, Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employment Decisions under the ADA 
Titles I and V—Survey Update, 35 Mental & Physical Disability L Rptr 394, 395 (2011) 
(reporting a 98.2 percent win rate for employers for cases that were resolved at the time 
of the survey); Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions under the ADA Title I—Sur-
vey Update, 34 Mental & Physical Disability L Rptr 339, 340 (2010) (reporting a 97.4 per-
cent win rate for employers for cases that were resolved at the time of the survey). 
 5 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 
44 Wm & Mary L Rev 921, 926–27 (2003). 
 6 Pub L No 110-325, 122 Stat 3553, codified in various sections of Title 42. 
 7 See ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat at 3554. 
 8 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat at 3555, codified at 42 USC § 12102(4)(A). 
 9 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A). 
05 STEIN_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2014  11:11 AM 
692  The University of Chicago Law Review [81:689 
   
back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws.10 Granted, Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI)11 and the ADA have different goals. 
SSDI is designed to transition individuals no longer work capable 
due to disability out of the workforce,12 while the ADA is meant to 
retain work-capable disabled individuals in the workforce. Since 
the passage of the ADA, however, there has been conflict over 
which policy’s conception of disability, and which of these incom-
patible goals, should have primacy over individuals who can re-
main working as long as they are accommodated. 
In an early ADA case, the Supreme Court held that SSDI and 
ADA claims do not necessarily contradict each other; plaintiffs 
who file for SSDI prior to filing an ADA complaint must explain 
how the claim of being too disabled to work is consistent with the 
ADA claim of being able to perform essential job functions if pro-
vided reasonable accommodation.13 In so ruling, the Court side-
stepped the issue of which conception should prevail,14 portraying 
the SSDI and ADA processes as moving along nonintersecting 
tracks while inviting the introduction of an SSDI-like high 
threshold for protection under the ADA.15 As a result, it is more 
arduous for work-capable employees with disabilities to achieve 
accommodations needed to remain in the workplace than to ob-
tain disability benefits tied to ceasing to work. Although the 
ADAAA ought to reduce this bias that tilts employees toward 
stepping out of work, unless courts shift the focus of accommoda-
tion claims from demonstrating deep dysfunction to facilitating 
capability, the incentive to pursue SSDI benefits will persist. It 
remains to be seen whether courts can successfully integrate de-
terminations of disability with determinations that individuals 
are capable of performing essential job functions with or without 
accommodations. 
Aging demographics further complicate the disjuncture be-
tween these competing statutory and administrative regimes. 
Simply put, people are living longer and are expected or required 
 
 10 See Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 
54 Cal L Rev 809, 821–23 (1966). 
 11 42 USC § 423. 
 12 See Bagenstos, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 936 (cited in note 5) (stating that SSDI 
“seeks to provide a safety net”). 
 13 See Cleveland v Policy Management Systems Corp, 526 US 795, 797–98 (1999). 
 14 See id at 801 (stating that both the Social Security Act and the ADA help the dis-
abled, “but in different ways”). 
 15 See id at 806 (holding that the plaintiff “cannot [ ] ignore the apparent contradic-
tion” in applying for both benefits, but must proffer a sufficient explanation).  
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to remain at their jobs until a greater age because of economic 
factors like depleted pension systems.16 A fortunate minority of 
aging workers will receive accommodations and remain occupa-
tionally active. However, the majority likely will experience alter-
ations in functioning that are common to the aging process and 
may affect perceptions of job capability with or without accommo-
dations. Such aging individuals are especially vulnerable to being 
forced out of jobs and onto Social Security disability benefits be-
fore they reach retirement age, or into earlier retirement than 
they desire, despite still being work capable if they lack access to 
accommodations for natural aging. Although aging is a normal 
process, it systematically distances people from the idealized bod-
ies and minds of paradigm workers for whom workplaces are de-
signed.17 The tendency to force older workers out of jobs is driven 
by the same mistaken view that often keeps people with disabili-
ties out of the labor market: the myth that efficiency and profit 
demand one-size-fits-all workplaces and workers. 
This Article contends that the focus of American disability 
law and policy should not be the eligibility of individuals for ac-
commodations because they happen to have a legally sufficient 
impairment, but the effectiveness of potential accommodations. It 
therefore proposes “accommodating every body”18 in principle by 
extending an ADA-like reasonable-accommodation mandate to all 
work-capable members of the general population for whom the 
provision of reasonable accommodation is necessary to give mean-
ingful access to enable their ability to work.19 Not every desire for 
accommodation—even when the accommodation would, in some 
way, be effective—would result in entitlement. To achieve that 
legal right, the proposed accommodation would have to be neces-
sary for an individual to fulfill essential job functions and not be 
unduly burdensome for the employer. All bodies would thus, in 
principle, be eligible for accommodation. The focus under our pro-
posal is on the accommodation itself: how effectively the accom-
modation enables functionality that otherwise would be lost due 
to intolerant or exclusionary workplace practices.  
 
 16 See Part II.A. 
 17 Ruth Colker, When Is Separate Unequal? A Disability Perspective 142 (Cambridge 
2009). 
 18 This Article construes “body” broadly to include psychological as well as physical 
characteristics. 
 19 See Part V. 
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Our proposal thus shifts the locus of accommodation disputes 
from the contentious identity-based contours of the “disabled” 
plaintiff to the underlying issue of alleged discrimination. It rem-
edies problems arising from excluding “unworthy” individuals 
from employment opportunity—people whose functional modes 
do not comply with prevailing workforce design and organiza-
tional presumptions and who therefore require accommodation. 
Unless such a proposal is adopted, growing demands to extend 
the length of time people remain at work will be compromised by 
severely diminished employment opportunities for aging individ-
uals still capable of contributing on the job. Provision of accom-
modations for age-related alteration of functionality, when the ac-
commodations are effective, is reasonably prescribed because 
maximum retention of capabilities as individuals grow older is in 
everyone’s interest, whether or not they also possess identity-
based characteristics sufficient to constitute a “disability” under 
the ADA. 
Part I briefly addresses the history, scope, and purpose of rea-
sonable accommodations within and beyond American disability 
law. Part I also observes that while courts have taken an increas-
ingly sophisticated approach to redressing discrimination based 
on sex and gender, this has not translated into a sufficiently com-
prehensive view of the complexities of disability. Next, Part II ar-
gues that due to people living longer and dwindling pensions, ex-
cluding work-capable individuals experiencing natural 
limitations of aging from the economic and social benefits of em-
ployment invokes immense and unjustifiable social costs. Part II 
also reviews the political and judicial history that has placed the 
ADA’s promise of accommodation as a remedy for disability dis-
crimination beyond so many plaintiffs’ reach. Part III considers 
post-ADAAA case law and finds early indications that the amend-
ments are still deficient for disabled plaintiffs seeking accommo-
dations; equality of opportunity demands a more progressive vi-
sion of workplace accommodations than the ADAAA provides. 
Part IV explores complexities arising from the multiple, shifting 
conceptualizations of disability identity and presents the prob-
lems inherent in expecting that various familiar approaches to 
defining disability can produce a proxy for being deserving of ac-
commodation. 
Part V argues in favor of “accommodating every body” in prin-
ciple by extending the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation require-
ment to all work-capable members of the general population for 
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whom reasonable workplace accommodation is necessary for, and 
effective in, providing meaningful access and thereby enabling 
the ability to work. The proposal shifts the focus of accommoda-
tion disputes away from the highly polarized identity-based con-
tours of whether a claimant is “disabled” toward establishing al-
legations of discrimination. Part VI underscores the justifications 
for this proposal and elucidates its benefits. It distinguishes ac-
commodations from benefits or privileges and demonstrates that 
accommodations are justified by the democratic values of integra-
tion, equal opportunity, and tolerance. The Article concludes by 
exploring the structural, expressive, economic, and hedonic bene-
fits that arise from applying the principle of accommodating every 
body. 
I.  ACCOMMODATIONS AS EQUALITY 
Reasonable workplace accommodations for disabled persons 
originated with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,20 but came to 
prominence with Title I of the ADA.21 This mandate requires em-
ployers to provide a proportionately affordable alteration to a spe-
cific job, and has been adopted internationally as part of disabil-
ity-based legal protections. It departs in both theory and practice 
from the concepts of benefits or privileges in that reasonable ac-
commodations are part of the antidiscrimination canon.22 Fur-
ther, their provision is necessary for attaining the democratic val-
ues of equal opportunity, tolerance, and inclusive participation. 
A. The Reasonable-Accommodation Mandate 
The Rehabilitation Act was the first statutory mandate of 
reasonable accommodations for current or potential employees 
with disabilities,23 but the mandate gained prominence with the 
ADA. The nearly two-decade interval between those statutes wit-
nessed federal commissions advocating for expansion of disabil-
ity-based discrimination laws, at least in part due to the analogue 
 
 20 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified as amended at 29 USC § 701 et seq.  
 21 ADA Title I, 104 Stat at 330–37. 
 22 See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommoda-
tions as Antidiscrimination, 153 U Pa L Rev 579, 583 (2004) (arguing that accommodations 
are antidiscrimination remedies); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommoda-
tion, 115 Harv L Rev 643, 645 (2001) (asserting that accommodations resemble and some-
times overlap with antidiscrimination measures). 
 23 29 USC § 701(a). 
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between race and sex discrimination and attitudes that excluded 
disabled persons from social participation.24 
The initial provision of reasonable accommodation in employ-
ment was unrelated to disability and addressed religious accom-
modation under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972.25 This origin is notable because every statutory iteration of 
the reasonable-accommodation mandate has been manifested as 
part of the American civil rights canon and grounded in notions 
of what equality requires under circumstances in which differ-
ences are salient.26 The normative theory underlying the provi-
sion of reasonable-accommodations challenges the assumption 
that labor markets begin from neutral and fair baselines.27 In-
stead, civil rights laws challenge the ideas and values that lead to 
workplaces being physically and administratively designed for 
the paradigmatic and idealized worker—specifically, the able-
bodied, heterosexual, Protestant white male.28 These presumed 
neutral baselines have in turn constructed occupational hierar-
chies across hiring, promotion, and retention practices and have 
resulted in historic inequities between an empowered main-
stream group and those with marginalized-identity characteris-
tics in regard to race, sex, and functional ability.29 Civil rights 
statutes respond to the impact of such inequities by prohibiting 
future discrimination against nonmainstream groups while also 
mandating adjustments to the workplace that enable categories 
 
 24 See National Council on the Handicapped, Report to the President and the Con-
gress of the United States, Appendix to Toward Independence: An Assessment of Federal 
Laws and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities—with Legislative Recommenda-
tions A-1 (1986); United States Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum 
of Individual Abilities 141 (1983). 
 25 Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103, codified in various sections of Titles 5 and 42. See 
also 42 USC § 2000e-2(j); Trans World Airlines, Inc v Hardison, 432 US 63, 74–75 & n 9 
(1977).  
 26 See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary 
B. Mahowald, eds, Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bio-
ethics and Public Policy 13, 74–75 (Rowman & Littlefield 1998). See also generally Martha 
Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Cornell 1990).  
 27 See Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 597 (cited in note 22) (“A central flaw . . . is the 
baseline assumption that accommodation costs are internally engendered by the disabled 
person’s inherent lower capability, rather than externally caused by social conditions.”). 
 28 See Ruth O’Brien, Crippled Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the 
Workplace 166–67 (Chicago 2001). 
 29 See Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Dis-
ability 39 (Routledge 1996) (“Societies [ ] are physically constructed and socially organized 
with the unacknowledged assumption that everyone is healthy, non-disabled, young but 
adult . . . and, often, male.”). 
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of individuals with biological differences to perform essential job 
functions. 
In the realms of race and sex, required emendations affect the 
manner in which jobs are structured and performed by revising 
respective underlying bona fide qualifications that previously ex-
cluded those individuals.30 In the context of sex, for example, 
many workplace-related standards have envisioned one particu-
lar way of accomplishing a required function, but it is often possi-
ble for women to execute the same function in an alternative man-
ner.31 Similarly, many employers have presupposed that a certain 
level of height, weight, strength, or physical capacity is necessary 
to perform a job, only to have such requirements invalidated by 
courts because a different level would still enable one to ably per-
form the job.32 Moreover, many workplace environments and 
pieces of equipment have been built or structured with the aver-
age man in mind, thereby excluding many women.33 Remedying 
 
 30 See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 436 (1971) (invalidating 
aptitude tests used in hiring for their disparate impact on African American workers be-
cause the tests were not “demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance”); Albe-
marle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 434–36 (1975) (striking down an employer’s intelli-
gence test as discriminatory to African Americans when the test may be relevant to future 
job progression); Connecticut v Teal, 457 US 440, 448–49 (1982) (invalidating a written 
examination required for promotions due to its disparate impact on African American em-
ployees); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 US 187, 200 (1991) (invalidating 
an employer’s sex-based fetal-protection policy as disparately impacting female employ-
ees). 
 31 “For example, women generally cannot perform the fireman’s lift to rescue people 
from a burning building.” But there are other modes of rescue with equivalent outcomes 
that allow women to execute the same function in an alternative manner—“such as drag-
ging victims out of the building rather than carrying them.” Anita Silvers, Protection or 
Privilege? Reasonable Accommodation, Reverse Discrimination, and the Fair Costs of Re-
pairing Recognition for Disabled People in the Workforce, 8 J Gender Race & Just 561, 
576–77 (2005). 
 32 See, for example, Lanning v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 
181 F3d 478, 485, 491–94 (3d Cir 1999) (holding that an employment screen that required 
transit police officers to run 1.5 miles in twelve minutes might not be justified by business 
necessity); Davis v County of Los Angeles, 566 F2d 1334, 1341–42 (9th Cir 1977) (invali-
dating a policy for firefighters that required a minimum height of five feet seven inches), 
vacd as moot, 440 US 625 (1979); United States v City of Chicago, 411 F Supp 218, 230–
31 (ND Ill 1976), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds 549 F2d 415 (7th Cir 1977) 
(holding that a police department’s five-feet-four-inches height requirement would be in-
valid, absent a strong showing of job relatedness); Meadows v Ford Motor Co, 62 FRD 98, 
99–100 (WD Ky 1973) (striking down a policy for production line employees that required 
a minimum weight of 150 pounds). 
 33 See Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm 
of Sex Discrimination, 79 U Colo L Rev 1297, 1303–05 (2008) (examining cockpits, work 
tables, machinery, and the industrial workplace generally to explore “built environment” 
exclusion). 
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all such practices or structures that result in a disparate impact 
on women involves accommodations of a sort to provide women 
with equality of opportunity in the workplace. 
In the disability context, the provision of reasonable accom-
modation levels uneven playing fields that historically have been 
presumed unbiased, but operate from baselines that reflect cul-
tural prejudice and result in workplace exclusion.34 In this re-
spect, reasonable-accommodation challenges assumptions that 
workplaces must operate in certain modalities and points out that 
the presumed inherency of a status quo is itself predicated on a 
noninclusive worldview.35 Further, a social model of disability 
maintains that it is these culturally constructed and remediable 
conventions that create the category of “disabled” people, rather 
than any biological limitations inherent in members of the 
group.36 An obvious illustration of this view is the effect that stairs 
at the entry point to an office will have in barring persons with 
various mobility impairments, whereas a flat threshold would en-
able those individuals (as well as many others, such as parents 
with stroller-bound children) to access the same site.37 Less ap-
parent are facially neutral policies such as those allowing all 
workers ten-minute smoking breaks, but not permitting breaks of 
equal length for workers with disabilities to focus out schizo-
phrenic voices or administer insulin injections.38 
 
 34 See Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 584 (cited in note 22) (arguing that the ADA takes 
steps to remedy inherent discrimination against the disabled that is based on mispercep-
tions “held out as true and rational beliefs”). 
 35 See Silvers, Formal Justice at 74–75 (cited in note 26) (“If the majority of people 
. . . wheeled rather than walked, graceful spiral ramps instead of jarringly angular stair-
cases would connect lower to upper floors of buildings.”). 
 36 Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Su-
preme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Consti-
tutional Classification, 35 U Mich J L Ref 81, 84 (2001) (arguing that “the methodology for 
assessing disability as a classification still depends on out-of-date notions rooted in empir-
ically unsubstantiated social conventions”). 
 37 See Ronald L. Mace, Graeme J. Hardie, and Jaine P. Place, Accessible Environ-
ments: Toward Universal Design, in Wolfgang F.E. Prieser, Jacqueline C. Vischer, and 
Edward T. White, eds, Design Intervention: Toward a More Humane Architecture 155, 156 
(Van Nostrand Reinhold 1991) (discussing universal design, the central tenet of which is 
an approach to creating environments and products that are “usable by all people to the 
greatest extent possible”). 
 38 For a discussion of how workers with mental disabilities self-accommodate, see 
Susan Stefan, Hollow Promises: Employment Discrimination against People with Mental 
Disabilities 179–80 (American Psychological Association 2002). For a discussion of the ef-
ficiency of basing hiring decisions on whether a candidate has a mental illness, see Eliza-
beth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the 
ADA, 94 Georgetown L J 399, 414–19 (2006).  
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When passing the ADA, Congress recognized that exclusion-
ary baselines are not inexorable and can be ameliorated by provi-
sion of reasonable accommodation.39 It is thus no surprise that the 
statute, with its reasonable-accommodation mandate, was con-
sistently described and praised as enabling equal civil rights for 
Americans with disabilities.40 Nor is it surprising that the ADA 
prominently proscribes the denial of reasonable accommodations 
as a prohibited form of discrimination41 or that Congress, when 
amending the statute, attempted to decouple reasonable accom-
modation from a stringent identity criterion that limited its ap-
plication.42 Although it is too early to assess the full impact of the 
ADAAA, it is fair to contrast the progressive vision that Congress 
held, both in the original and amended versions of the ADA, with 
that of a judiciary that is seemingly mired in a century-old con-
ceptualization of the proper place for, and abilities of, those with 
disabilities.43 
Moreover, the provision of reasonable workplace accommoda-
tions has now become a regular feature of contemporary global 
disability-based legal protections.44 The most expansive example 
is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities45 (CRPD), which has been ratified by 138 nations as 
of this writing.46 The CRPD requires States Parties to ensure the 
provision of reasonable workplace accommodations47 and defines 
the denial of reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimina-
tion.48 On the regional level, the European Union’s employment-
discrimination directive requires that individual employers 
 
 39 See ADA § 2, 104 Stat at 328–29. 
 40 For a collection of many words of praise for the ADA, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation 
Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv CR–CL L Rev 413, 413–15 (1991).  
 41 42 USC § 12112(b)(5). 
 42 ADAAA § 2, 122 Stat at 3554 (rejecting the “demanding standard” judges used in 
applying the ADA). 
 43 See Silvers and Stein, 35 U Mich J L Ref at 94 (cited in note 36) (arguing that the 
judiciary is “operating from an assumption that disability as a classification is defined by 
a characteristic of incompetence”). 
 44 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights 
Movement 55 (Yale 2009) (asserting that “accommodation mandates are the centerpiece of 
disability discrimination laws”). 
 45 Resolution 62/170, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Op-
tional Protocol Thereto, 77th mtg (Dec 18, 2007) (CRPD).  
 46 Comprehensive information on the CRPD process is set forth on a website main-
tained by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs called Enable, 
online at http://www.un.org/disabilities (visited May 21, 2014). 
 47 See CRPD Art 27(1)(i) (cited in note 45).  
 48 See CRPD Art 2 (cited in note 45). 
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within each of the Member States undertake appropriate 
measures to provide reasonable workplace accommodations, and 
likewise construes the denial of reasonable accommodations as 
discrimination.49 Examples of national legislation incorporating 
similar reasonable workplace accommodation mandates include 
Costa Rica,50 Ghana,51 Hungary,52 Malta,53 and the United King-
dom.54 The reasonable-accommodation mandate is also a central 
part of the global legal reform of domestic disability laws precipi-
tated by the CRPD.55 This is especially significant because fewer 
than fifty countries currently have systemic disability laws,56 and 
 
 49 See Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 OJ L303/16, 19 
(Nov 27, 2000). The European Union ratified the CRPD as a regional body, the first time 
it acceded to a UN human rights treaty. One consequence is that each Member State will 
need to transpose the CRPD’s employment provisions, which in places go beyond the 
Framework Directive. See Lisa Waddington, Reflections on the Establishment of a Frame-
work to Promote, Protect and Monitor Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (Article 33(2) CRPD) by the European Union *7 (Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2011-3, Jan 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1746866 (visited May 21, 2014) (reflecting on “the role which spe-
cific EU institutions could play in the implementation and monitoring framework” of the 
CRPD). 
 50 See Theresia Degener and Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative 
and Regional Disability Law Reform, in Mary Lou Breslin and Silvia Yee, eds, Disability 
Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives 3, 36–37 (Transnational 
2002). 
 51 See id at 29, 34 (identifying Ghana as including disability under both constitu-
tional and civil antidiscrimination laws), citing Persons with Disability Act, 2006, Act 715, 
§ 11-11. 
 52 See Degener and Quinn, International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law 
Reform at 34 (cited in note 50), citing Equalization Opportunity Law Act No XXVI, ch III 
§ 15 (1998). 
 53 Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act, ch 413, Act 1 of 2000, § 7(2)(d) 
(Malta) (construing discrimination on the grounds of disability as including the failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation).  
 54 See Anna Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: The Role of Reasonable 
Adjustment 63 (Hart 2008). 
 55 See Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 Hum Rts L Rev 1, 27 (2008) 
(“The incorporation of a State obligation to ensure that reasonable accommodations are 
made to facilitate the exercise by persons with disability of CRPD rights is perhaps the 
most fundamental instrumental element of the convention.”); Janet E. Lord and Michael 
Ashley Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 Wash L Rev 449, 451 (2008) 
(“[T]he CRPD initiates an unprecedented opportunity for domestic law, policy reform, and 
genesis on behalf of the globe’s ‘largest minority.’”). 
 56 For the most recent catalogue, see Degener and Quinn, A Survey of International, 
Comparative and Regional Disability Law Reform at 3 (cited in note 50). Since the CRPD’s 
passage, one of the authors has been involved in disability-related law reform in some 
three dozen countries. For that perspective, see Michael Ashley Stein and Janet E. Lord, 
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disability-related employment laws and policy initiatives are be-
ing undertaken for the first time in many parts of the world, in-
cluding developing nations.57 
B. Accommodations as Civil Rights 
In at least one important respect, however, American antidis-
crimination law aimed at providing disability-based equality of 
opportunity has yet to attain an ambit analogous to that which 
courts have come to accord to earlier civil rights laws. To illus-
trate, protection against sex discrimination was initially taken to 
be a benefit only for women, due to the prominence of their suf-
fering from sex bias in the workplace and their influence in the 
achievement of relevant civil rights law.58 Yet, over the last half 
century and especially the past two decades, an understanding 
that such protection must extend more widely has evolved. In In-
ternational Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc,59 
for instance, the Supreme Court ruled that denying women bet-
ter-paying work assignments based on protecting their reproduc-
tive function was discriminatory in part because the employer did 
not impose the same prohibition on men to protect their reproduc-
tive function.60 Similarly, in Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc,61 the Court ruled that Title VII prohibits workplace dis-
crimination based on sex, even when all the parties involved are 
male.62 
Changes in both science and fashion affecting gender and sex 
assignment also inspire evolving recognition that males and fe-
males are equally vulnerable to discrimination that invokes sex, 
and that the effectiveness of protection for all people, regardless 
of biological sex or gendered-role assignment, should be the 
 
Forging Effective International Agreements: Lessons from the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, in Jody Heymann and Adèle Cassola, eds, Making Equal 
Rights Real: Taking Effective Action to Overcome Global Challenges 27, 27–47 (Cambridge 
2012). 
 57 See Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 
58 Hastings L J 1203, 1213–14 (2007). 
 58 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: 
From Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L Rev 1333, 1345 (2010) (describing 
women’s involvement in the civil rights movement). 
 59 499 US 187 (1991). 
 60 See id at 198–200. 
 61 523 US 75 (1998). 
 62 See id at 77–80. 
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same.63 For example, in regard to the gendering of a caregiver 
role, in 1999 a highway patrolman triumphed over his state em-
ployer that, based on his sex, had denied him protection as a pri-
mary caregiver for his newborn child under the Family and Med-
ical Leave Act of 199364 (FMLA).65 And in regard to biological sex, 
in 2006 a court allowed a transsexual’s denial-of-employment suit 
to proceed against the Library of Congress under Title VII be-
cause “discrimination against transsexuals because they are 
transsexuals is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’”;66 the 
court likewise rejected an eligibility standard that construed Title 
VII protection as a benefit only for born women because of “the 
factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity.”67 As 
the court explained, “[t]hese complexities stem from real varia-
tions in how the different components of biological sexuality . . . 
interact with each other, and in turn, with social, psychological, 
and legal conceptions of gender.”68 The US Department of Justice 
did not appeal, and in 2008 a federal district judge issued a 
groundbreaking decision finding that sex discrimination had oc-
curred because the Library’s withdrawal of a job offer was 
prompted by the prospective employee’s sex change.69 In conse-
quence, the government was ordered to pay nearly $500,000 as 
compensation for the discrimination, the maximum allowable in 
the case.70 
In contrast, the approach to protecting against disability dis-
crimination continues to oversimplify the varied interactions 
 
 63 See, for example, id at 79–80 (holding that a male employee’s claim of same-sex 
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Barnes v City of Cincinnati, 401 F3d 
729, 737 (6th Cir 2005) (holding that discriminating against a preoperative male-to-female 
transsexual police officer for failing to conform to sexual stereotypes violates Title VII); 
Smith v City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F3d 566, 572–75 (6th Cir 2004) (holding that a male 
employee with gender identity disorder may not be discriminated against for failing to 
conform to gender expectations); Schafer v Board of Public Education of the School District 
of Pittsburgh, PA, 903 F2d 243, 248 (3d Cir 1990) (holding that reserving the benefit of 
one-year leave without pay exclusively for female teachers impermissibly discriminates 
against their male counterparts). 
 64 Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 5 and 
29. 
 65 See Knussman v Maryland, 272 F3d 625, 635–37 (4th Cir 2001). Knussman’s wife 
had a difficult pregnancy and medical complications after delivery that necessitated her 
taking sick leave; Knussman sought leave to care for both his wife and his child. Id at 628–
29. 
 66 Schroer v Billington, 424 F Supp 2d 203, 212 (DDC 2006). 
 67 See id at 211–12. 
 68 Id at 212–13. 
 69 Schroer v Billington, 577 F Supp 2d 293, 308 (DDC 2008). 
 70 Schroer v Billington, 2009 WL 1543686, *4 (DDC). 
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among the components of impairment, as well as the complex in-
terplay of physiological, social, and legal conceptions of disability. 
A long history of charitable public and private programs frames 
disability-discrimination policy, making it difficult to advance be-
yond the idea that accommodation protection is a special benefit 
for which the eligibility bar must be set high. Unlike sex-discrim-
ination protections, which have evolved in the direction of protect-
ing not just women, but whoever happens to be harmed by bias 
based on sex,71 the scope of disability-discrimination protection 
seems not to have progressed. The divisions between race-based, 
sex-based, and disability-based workplace discrimination are not 
decisively sharp, however. The biases fueling all three kinds of 
wrong, as well as the pretexts implementing them, arise from dis-
comfort about lack of fit with whatever workplace practices are 
normative at the time and thereby result in refutable attributions 
of incapability. Such stigmatization has precluded racial minori-
ties and women, as well as work-capable people who depart in 
other ways from idealized worker paradigms, from productive and 
rewarding employment. 
As this Article explains in Part V, European disability juris-
prudence attempts to remedy vulnerability, broadly construed, to 
disability discrimination rather than focusing narrowly on 
whether each individual is sufficiently vulnerable to deserve pro-
tection. Hence, non-US courts have taken up the sophisticated 
civil rights conception of disability that Congress built into the 
ADA, but which American judges have left behind. 
II.  DISABLING THE WORKFORCE 
Modern health-care advances are enabling people to live 
longer while changes to retirement and pension systems require 
people to work to older ages.72 Many of these individuals will in 
consequence experience impairments that require workplace ac-
commodation. Removing work-capable individuals from the labor 
market will invoke immense and unjustifiable social costs. ADA 
implementation that focuses on initial determinations dividing 
 
 71 See Oncale, 523 US at 82 (overturning Fifth Circuit precedent that sexual harass-
ment of males by other males creates no cause of action under Title VII). 
 72 See David E. Bloom, David Canning, and Günther Fink, Implications of Popula-
tion Aging for Economic Growth *25 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper No 16705, Jan 2011), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16705.pdf (visited May 
21, 2014); Courtney C. Coile and Phillip B. Levine, Reconsidering Retirement: How Losses 
and Layoffs Affect Older Workers 44 (Brookings 2010). 
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individuals who deserve to be accommodated so as to remain on 
the job from those who are unworthy of such retention cannot help 
but drive up those costs. 
A. The Changing Workforce 
The need for aging workers to stay on the job is spurred by 
both demographic changes and policy considerations. Increasing 
overall life expectancy,73 combined with the baby boom generation 
reaching the eligibility age for retirement benefits,74 has contrib-
uted to a significant graying of America.75 
Yet, despite reports that aging workers need to work longer, 
the number of US workers claiming Social Security benefits is in-
creasing at an unsustainable pace.76 Recent forecasts by the fed-
eral government show Social Security and Medicare currently be-
ing funded at a rate that will not cover future expenditures.77 
Medicare, which provides health insurance to 47 million elderly 
and disabled Americans, is projected to begin running a deficit in 
2024.78 Social Security, which in 2010 began paying out more in 
benefits than it collects in taxes, is expected to be insolvent by 
2036.79 While rising public-welfare expenditures have long and of-
ten been discussed loosely as a “crisis,”80 the looming insolvency 
of Social Security and Medicare helps concretize the gravity of the 
current situation. 
Similar rising dependency costs are associated with the SSDI 
program, which provides income support and medical benefits to 
 
 73 See Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 77 table 105, 
80 table 108, online at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html (visited 
May 21, 2014) (profiling a steady rise in life expectancy over the period 1970–2008). 
 74 Social Security Administration, Status of the Social Security and Medicare Pro-
grams: A Summary of the 2011 Annual Reports *4, online at http://www.ssa.gov/history 
/pdf/tr11summary.pdf (visited May 21, 2014). 
 75 The share of those aged sixty-five and over is expected to rise from 17 percent in 
2000 to 28 percent by 2050. David Neumark and Joanne Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimi-
nation Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective? *1 (Michigan Retirement Re-
search Center Working Paper No 249, Sept 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1960716 (visited May 21, 2014).  
 76 Id at *1–3. For example, between 2008 and 2009, the number of workers claiming 
Social Security benefits rose by 23 percent. Id at *3. 
 77 See Social Security Administration, Status of the Social Security and Medicare 
Programs at *1 (cited in note 74). 
 78 Id at *11. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State 186–89 (Temple 1984) (discussing how “cri-
sis” is a popular, rhetorical device that does not offer insight into whether a program col-
lapse is imminent). 
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disabled individuals who are fully unable to work.81 SSDI’s mutu-
ally exclusive paradigm of disability and employability was ques-
tionable even in 1956 when a substantial portion of jobs involved 
strenuous activity.82 Most current jobs are not predicated on phys-
ically strenuous activities, and many individuals with impair-
ments can remain in the labor force with appropriate accommo-
dation.83 Workplace accommodations such as flexible hours, 
assistive technologies, telecommuting, and adjusting tasks to be 
less physically strenuous can help keep employees working and 
economically independent. 
Significantly and problematically, once employees develop a 
work-limiting impairment, the SSDI program discourages im-
paired workers from remaining in the workforce. Instead, the pro-
gram provides strong incentives for workers to seek SSDI bene-
fits—and for employers to terminate impaired employees.84 In 
particular, employees are induced to quit their jobs immediately 
after the onset of a work-limiting disability since it is impossible 
under current law for them to obtain assistance from SSDI with-
out first leaving the labor force; workers who participate in gain-
ful employment during the application period are automatically 
denied benefits.85 Once workers have left the labor force, they en-
ter the throes of an SSDI application process that can take 
 
 81 See Social Security Administration, How We Decide If You Are Disabled, online at 
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/step4and5.htm (visited May 21, 2014) (explaining that “you 
are not disabled according to our rules unless your illnesses, injuries or conditions prevent 
you from doing your past work or adjusting to other work”). 
 82 See David H. Autor and Mark Duggan, Supporting Work: A Proposal for Modern-
izing the U.S. Disability Insurance System *1–2 (The Center for American Progress and 
the Hamilton Project Dec 2010), online at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6281 (visited May 
21, 2014). 
 83 See Ross C. Brownson, Tegan K. Boehmer, and Douglas A. Luke, Declining Rates 
of Physical Activity in the United States: What Are the Contributors?, 26 Ann Rev Pub 
Health 421, 427–30 (attributing declining levels of physical activity in part to more seden-
tary employment). 
 84 See David Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United 
States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options *8 (MIT Working Paper No 12-01, Nov 
2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987244 (visited May 21, 2014). 
 85 See id at *9. See also Coile and Levine, Reconsidering Retirement at 127 (cited in 
note 72) (noting unemployed workers may adjust their behavior to make it more likely 
they will receive benefits—a “moral hazard”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: 
Managing Social Security Disability Claims 20 (Yale 1983) (noting that Congress has con-
tinuously seen Social Security as, among other things, an “open invitation to drop out of 
the work force”). 
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months or years, due to both the statutory waiting period and de-
lays in the process.86 If the claim is denied, the claimant then faces 
an uphill battle to return to the market after an extended ab-
sence.87 If the process leads to an SSDI award, the claimant faces 
strong pressures to refrain from working in order not to jeopard-
ize hard-fought and obtained benefits.88 This system provides a 
mild incentive for employers to terminate employees and no in-
centive for employers to weigh the costs they impose on the SSDI 
system against the alternative costs of providing accommodations 
that might allow employees to keep working.89 As labor economist 
David Autor notes, “It is difficult to overstate the role that the 
SSDI program currently plays in discouraging the ongoing em-
ployment of non-elderly adults.”90 
As with Social Security and Medicare, the SSDI program’s 
costs have become unsustainable.91 Between 1989 and 2009, the 
share of adults receiving SSDI benefits doubled, from 2.3 percent 
to 4.6 percent of Americans ages twenty-five to sixty-four.92 
 
 86 See Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States at 
*9–10 (cited in note 84). 
 87 See id at *10. See also Stone, The Disabled State at 180 (cited in note 80) (“Partic-
ularly in fragmented systems like the American one, where disability evaluation is not 
connected with actual job-finding services, the determination of residual working ability 
is likely to leave the individual in a no-man’s-land: he or she is ‘found’ able to work but not 
‘found’ a job.”). 
 88 See Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States at 
*10 (cited in note 84). 
 89 See id at *9. There is of course one incentive to provide an accommodation for a 
statutorily defined disability: to avoid litigation under the ADA. However, very few will in 
actuality sue. Additionally, many employees will develop a work-limiting impairment that 
does not rise to the level of an ADA-defined “disability.” See notes 132–34 and accompa-
nying text. There is also a mild incentive for small businesses to provide accommodations 
through a yearly tax credit up to about $5,000, which is available to small businesses that 
provide certain types of accommodations. 26 USC § 44. 
 90 Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States at *10 
(cited in note 84). Richard Burkhauser further warns: 
The disproportionate growth in the younger transfer population is rapidly 
changing our disability-transfer system from one primarily meant to ease the 
transition into retirement for older workers to a program providing lifetime 
transfers from cradle to grave. This growth is unprecedented in the history of 
our system and is counter to the goal of integrating people with disabilities into 
mainstream employment. Increasingly, the SSI and SSDI programs are being 
used as alternatives to a more general income maintenance program. 
Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 
Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 71, 82 (1997). 
 91 See Autor and Duggan, Supporting Work at *2 (cited in note 82). 
 92 Id. 
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Within the same time frame, annual cash payments to SSDI re-
cipients rose from $40 to $121 billion, and accompanying Medi-
care expenditures rose from $18 to $69 billion.93 SSDI expendi-
tures now outpace the tax revenue dedicated to the program by 
30 percent, leading the Trustees of the Social Security Admin-
istration to forecast SSDI insolvency as early as 2015.94 The cu-
mulative economic costs of these several projections are, of course, 
significant. It will require innovation and foresight for govern-
ment entitlements to keep pace with SSDI, along with Social Se-
curity and Medicare. 
Moreover, recent statistics indicate that both the aging and 
disabled populations are employed at relatively low rates. As the 
disability rolls have risen, the employment rate of people with 
disabilities has fallen.95 For example, the gap in the employment 
rate between people aged forty to sixty-five years with disabilities 
and their counterparts without disabilities widened by 10 percent 
from 1988 to 2008.96 This widening has resulted in an even more 
substantial gap between people with disabilities and those with-
out. For example, in 2008, the employment rate of males in their 
forties and fifties with a self-reported disability was about 16 per-
cent, compared to 88 percent employment of comparably aged 
males with no reported disability.97 The employment rate of aging 
workers is low as well. Recent studies suggest that age discrimi-
nation against middle-aged workers (aged approximately forty to 
sixty-five years) is common, which in turn increases the likelihood 
they will separate from their employer and subsequently be un-
employed.98 Additionally, the most recent data suggest those aged 
sixty-five and over are employed at an extremely low rate relative 
to the population.99 One reason for the lower employment rates of 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id at *3. See also Phil Izzo, Number of the Week: Disability Fund Three Years from 
Insolvency, Real Time Economics Blog (Wall St J June 1, 2013), online at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/06/01/number-of-the-week-disability-fund-three-
years-from-insolvency (visited May 21, 2014).  
 95 See Autor and Duggan, Supporting Work at *2–5 (cited in note 82). 
 96 Id at *2.  
 97 See id. 
 98 See Neumark and Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Secu-
rity Reforms More Effective? at *5–6 (cited in note 75) (canvassing research that has found 
evidence of age discrimination against those under the age of sixty-five). 
 99 In 2006, only 15 percent of those aged sixty-five and over were employed. David 
Neumark, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Challenge of Population 
Aging, 31 Rsrch on Aging 41, 43 (2009). See also Neumark and Song, Do Stronger Age 
Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective? at *1 (cited in note 75) 
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these groups is straightforward. Aging systematically and gener-
ally makes working more difficult, as people develop various ill-
nesses and impairments. In addition, there may appear to be a 
net economic incentive not to hire or retain individuals with such 
impairments, for fear of overt efficiency or accommodation 
costs.100 
For workers with impairments, there are thus demand-side 
and supply-side impediments to their continued employment. 
First, there is a demand-side dilemma, in which workers with im-
pairments may require a modification or accommodation but be 
reluctant to request it from their employer. Impaired individuals’ 
reluctance to request an accommodation may be driven by ques-
tions regarding whether they have a legally defined “disability,” 
the desire to avoid the perception they are getting “special” treat-
ment, an inhospitable workplace culture, fears of retaliation, 
and/or the incentive to pursue SSDI benefits instead of pursuing 
work. Second, there is a supply-side problem, in which employers 
are reluctant to structure the workplace to attract and retain par-
tially disabled and elderly employees who are capable of working. 
Employer reluctance may be driven by a desire to avoid accom-
modation costs, simple bias, and/or inertia toward maintaining 
the status quo. Still, older workers are more able than ever to 
work, especially with accommodations, since the length of healthy 
old age—not just absolute life expectancy—has steadily increased 
over time.101 
At least part of the solution to rising dependency costs is to 
incentivize aging workers to keep working. Many different recom-
 
(“[T]he very low employment rate of seniors implies slowing labor force growth relative to 
population, and a rising dependency ratio.”). 
 100 See, for example, Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 23 Regulation 21, 22–23 (2000) (documenting how the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate has increased the cost of employing disabled workers and thus 
made such workers unattractive to businesses). 
 101 See Bloom, Canning, and Fink, Implications of Population Aging for Economic 
Growth at *1 (cited in note 72). 
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mendations within this vein have been advanced, including rais-
ing the retirement age for full Social Security benefits,102 requir-
ing employers to offer workers private disability insurance,103 
providing a tax credit for disabled workers,104 and increasing the 
amount of Social Security recipient earnings that are exempt 
from taxation.105 The sum result of these demographic and eco-
nomic developments is that it is more necessary than ever for ag-
ing employees—many of whom have impairments ranging from 
mild to severe—to continue working. In short, people who live 
longer must be able to work longer. 
All these recommendations for responding to the graying of 
the national population depend upon the opportunity for aging 
workers to obtain and/or maintain jobs. However, aging and/or 
disabled workers face several naturalized, workplace-specific im-
pediments—in addition to the incentives not to work noted above. 
Prominent among these may be a form of age bias that resembles 
disability bias by confining those targeted to unobtrusive or retir-
ing roles. A 2013 Princeton University age-discrimination study 
found that while college students valued potential collaborators 
of all ages who were demonstratively generous, the participants 
downgraded only “assertive” potential collaborators who were 
older; potential collaborators who were both “assertive” and 
young (or middle-aged) still received uniformly positive scores.106 
 
 102 See Coile and Levine, Reconsidering Retirement at 129–30 (cited in note 72). Rais-
ing the retirement age has been an especially popular proposal. For example, in 2011, US 
senators Lindsey Graham, Rand Paul, and Mike Lee proposed the Social Security Solvency 
and Sustainability Act, which would raise the retirement age under Social Security from 
sixty-seven to seventy. S 804, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S2446 (Apr 13, 2011). 
 103 See Autor and Duggan, Supporting Work at *17–18 (cited in note 82) (proposing 
that employers be required to offer workers private disability insurance, in part so that 
employers have an incentive to recognize the costs their decisions regarding whether to 
accommodate have on the broader disability system). See also Stone, The Disabled State 
at 181 (cited in note 80) (“Since employers do not pay direct premiums for Social Security 
disability programs, as they do for industrial accident insurance, they do not perceive any 
direct costs when they shift their less productive workers into these social insurance 
schemes.”). 
 104 See Burkhauser, 549 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 81–82 (cited in note 90) 
(proposing a disabled-worker tax credit that would “subsidize the labor earnings of people 
with disabilities who live in low-income families”). 
 105 See Neumark and Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Secu-
rity Reforms More Effective? at *1 (cited in note 75). 
 106 Michael Winerip, Three Men, Three Ages. Which Do You Like?, NY Times B1 (July 
22, 2013). See also generally Raymond F. Gregory, Age Discrimination in the American 
Workplace: Old at a Young Age (Rutgers 2001) (considering the ways in which age discrim-
ination persists and will likely increase as America’s economic outlook becomes less opti-
mistic). 
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The results of this study are illustrative of the “subtle bias” older 
men and women continue to face in the workforce.107 
B. The Current Gap between Work Capability and 
Accommodation 
Employment-discrimination statutes are intuitively promis-
ing legal avenues for helping employees with developing impair-
ments who are still work capable to remain on the job. Yet anti-
discrimination statutes generally and the ADA in particular are 
ironically ill suited for this group once judges are required to de-
termine the worthiness for accommodation of a given individual’s 
impairment.108 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967109 
(ADEA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008110 (GINA), and the ADA may appear apposite for protecting 
aging and work-capable employees. However, there are limits to 
the efficacy of each of these statutes. None is likely to aid with the 
new hiring of workers of any age because simply enforcing exist-
ing antidiscrimination laws—when they are enforced—is unlikely 
to help individuals start working.111 Additionally, the ADEA and 
GINA fail as a structural matter to help employees who develop 
work-limiting impairments keep working. The ADEA prohibits 
age discrimination in employment against any individual at least 
forty years of age,112 but provides no positive rights (such as ac-
commodations) for aging workers with impairments.113 GINA pro-
hibits discrimination in employment against anyone on the basis 
 
 107 Winerip, Three Men, Three Ages, NY Times at B1 (cited in note 106). 
 108 See generally Silvers and Stein, 35 U Mich J L Ref 81 (cited in note 36) (comparing 
the judiciary’s retrogressive practice of presuming the incompetency of the disabled to out-
moded notions of the stereotypical incompetence of women); Anita Silvers and Michael 
Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Discrimination, 55 Vand L 
Rev 1341 (2002) (describing how current judicial approaches to disability and genetic dis-
crimination fail to adequately protect otherwise productive citizens). See also Bradley A. 
Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev 347, 385–87 (2011) (discussing the ex-
treme reliance by judges on medical diagnoses as proxies for whether someone is disabled).  
 109 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 621–34. 
 110 Pub L No 110-233, 122 Stat 881, codified in various sections of Titles 26 and 42. 
 111 See Coile and Levine, Reconsidering Retirement at 126–27 (cited in note 72) (not-
ing that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, such as the ADEA, “may not provide 
much help to older job losers struggling to find new work”). 
 112 29 USC §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a).  
 113 Even if age-related impairments require accommodation for a worker to stay qual-
ified or productive, there is no obligation under the ADEA to provide one. See, for example, 
Smith v Midland Brake, Inc, a Division of Echlin, Inc, 138 F3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir 1998) 
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of genetic information.114 However, once a genetically based con-
dition has manifested itself, the ADA—not GINA—applies.115 
Moreover GINA, much like the ADEA, provides no right to accom-
modation.116 
The ADA provides some, but not all, disabled workers with 
the right to reasonable accommodations.117 The ADA’s employ-
ment provisions define employment discrimination to include a 
failure to make reasonable accommodations for “an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability.”118 Having a “disability” un-
der the ADA means having (a) “a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual” (“actual” disability), (b) “a record of such an im-
pairment” (“record of” disability), or (c) “being regarded as having 
such an impairment” (“regarded as” disability).119 Notably, a 
“qualified individual” is one who can perform the essential func-
tions of a job either with or without accommodation.120 
 
(“The ADEA does not require employers to provide any sort of accommodations for em-
ployees who become unable to perform their jobs.”), revd on other grounds, Smith v Mid-
land Brake, Inc, 180 F3d 1154 (10th Cir 1999) (en banc). 
 114 GINA § 202, 122 Stat at 907, codified at 42 USC § 2000ff–1.  
 115 GINA § 210, 122 Stat at 920, codified at 42 USC § 2000ff–9.  
 116 See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 Ga L Rev 705, 
711–12 (2012) (explaining how GINA might benefit from an accommodation provision). 
 117 The ADA now expressly excludes those who meet only the “regarded as” definition 
of disability from having the right to reasonable accommodations. 42 USC § 12201(h). 
 118 42 USC § 12112(a), (b)(5) (noting that “discriminat[ing] against a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability because of the disability” includes an unwillingness to make rea-
sonable accommodations). 
 119 42 USC § 12102(2). “Broken out, actual disability contains three principle require-
ments: first, there must be a physical or mental impairment; second, the impairment must 
be substantially limiting; and last, the impairment must substantially limit a major life 
activity. The ‘physical or mental impairment’ requirement is rarely an issue in ADA case 
law.” Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the 
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 Ind L J 181, 211 (2008). “It is 
the second requirement—that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity—
that has garnered the majority of federal courts’ attention.” Id at 211–12 (emphasis 
added). Courts have interpreted these requirements narrowly, frequently finding that con-
ditions are either not substantially limiting or do not affect a major life activity. See 
ADAAA § 2(a)–(b), 122 Stat at 3553 (discussing Supreme Court cases that narrowed the 
definition of “disability,” prompting Congress to amend the ADA). And courts have inter-
preted “regarded as” claims to require proving one was regarded as having an “actual dis-
ability”—thus incorporating the same burdens associated with proving actual disability. 
Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 212 (cited in note 119). 
 120 42 USC § 12111(8). 
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Reasonable accommodations fall mainly into one of two cate-
gories. The first type concerns alteration of the physical work-
place, such as ramping stairs or adjusting the height of a sink.121 
These accommodations involve “hard” costs or immediate and 
concrete out-of-pocket expenses.122 The second main accommoda-
tion type requires altering the way jobs are structured. This could 
include modifying the criteria for applicants or rearranging work 
schedules.123 These accommodations involve “soft costs,” which 
are harder to quantify than out-of-pocket expenses, and could in-
volve external costs such as training human resource personnel.124 
The ADAAA stipulates that accommodations are not available for 
individuals who qualify for protection solely under the regarded-
as prong of the definition.125 
The ADA and its accompanying regulations require an appli-
cant or employee seeking accommodation to ask the employer for 
the accommodation. It is not necessary to indicate that the accom-
modation is being requested under the ADA or to use any magic 
language in making the request.126 An employer must then engage 
in an “interactive process” to evaluate the individual’s limitations 
and determine what potential reasonable accommodations might 
compensate for those limitations.127 If the employer declines the 
request and the applicant or worker would like to challenge that 
denial, he or she must then file a complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).128 The EEOC will in-
vestigate the issue and may attempt to resolve it through concili-
ation or by litigating the matter.129 If the parties, with the help of 
 
 121 Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 
Duke L J 79, 88 (2003). See also 42 USC § 12111(9)(A) (defining reasonable accommodation 
to include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable 
by individuals with disabilities”). 
 122 Stein, 53 Duke L J at 88 (cited in note 121). 
 123 See 42 USC § 12111(9)(B) (defining reasonable accommodation to include “job re-
structuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, ac-
quisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications 
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or inter-
preters, and other similar accommodations”). 
 124 Stein, 53 Duke L J at 88–89 (cited in note 121). 
 125 See 42 USC § 12201(h). 
 126 See, for example, Taylor v Phoenixville School District, 184 F3d 296, 313 (3d Cir 
1999). 
 127 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9. 
 128 42 USC § 2000e–5; 29 CFR §§ 1601.6–1601.8 (providing guidelines for this pro-
cess). 
 129 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability Rights Law: Cases and Materials 152 (Founda-
tion Press 2010). See also 42 USC § 2000e–5(b); 42 USC § 2000e–5(f). 
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the EEOC, cannot resolve their differences, then the individual 
may file suit in a federal district court alleging that the denial of 
the request for accommodation violates the ADA.130 If the court 
finds the requested accommodation was reasonable, then the em-
ployer must provide the accommodation or pay damages.131 
While the ADA provides a clear right and process for seeking 
reasonable accommodations, there are both structural and inter-
pretive challenges to securing them. The most fundamental has 
been mediating the disability-versus-ability-binary categories: 
proving that one’s impairment is severe enough to qualify under 
the ADA while at the same time showing that one is “qualified” 
and capable for a particular job. In other words, plaintiffs have 
had to show that they are “disabled enough” to seek a reasonable 
accommodation, but not “too disabled” and thus unqualified for 
the job.132 Indeed, the very evidence that plaintiffs must provide 
regarding the severity of their impairment may be used by an em-
ployer to argue that it was the degree of impairment that pre-
vented the plaintiff from performing essential job functions.133 
The result under the ADA has seemed to be that the measure of 
disability must be “just right” to establish an individual’s worthi-
ness to invoke the statute’s protections.134 
Pursuing accommodation presents further interpretive diffi-
culties, because once an applicant or employee shows she is disa-
bled enough to warrant the protections of the ADA, she faces a 
host of other jurisprudential challenges. While a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability may always seek a reasonable accommo-
dation, there are limits to whether an employer must provide an 
accommodation. Under the ADA, an employer does not have to 
provide an accommodation that would impose costs constituting 
an “undue hardship” on the operation of the employer’s busi-
ness.135 Since before the ADAAA judges focused on the strictures 
of the definition of disability at the summary judgment phase and 
avoided ruling on whether an accommodation is reasonable, there 
is little precedent to assure a challenging party that a particular 
 
 130 See Bagenstos, Disability Rights Law at 152 (cited in note 129). 
 131 42 USC § 1981a(a)(3). 
 132 Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 209–25 (cited in note 119) (analyzing in detail this compli-
cated tension). 
 133 See generally National Council on Disability, Defining “Disability” in a Civil 
Rights Context: The Courts’ Focus on Extent of Limitations as Opposed to Fair Treatment 
and Equal Opportunity (2003). 
 134 Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 209 (cited in note 119). 
 135 See 42 USC § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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accommodation will be found reasonable and not to constitute an 
undue hardship.136 The matter is further complicated because the 
language of reasonable-accommodation holdings tends to be 
nongeneral and fact specific.137 
The judiciary’s reluctance to adumbrate the issue of reasona-
ble accommodation has left a dearth of precedent and many issues 
unresolved.138 Examples of contested questions include whether 
an employer must reassign an individual with a disability to a 
vacant position when there is a more qualified applicant,139 
whether accommodations must be provided that enable someone 
to travel to work (as opposed to enabling them to do their job once 
they arrive on the premises),140 and whether there should be a 
presumption that allowing an employee to work from home is not 
a reasonable accommodation.141 Additionally, in considering the 
ultimate cost of the accommodation to the employer, there are un-
resolved issues about what benefits and costs should be consid-
ered. For benefits, should courts weigh the value of accommoda-
tions to other current and future employees with disabilities?142 
When the benefits of the accommodation extend to nondisabled 
 
 136 The fact-intensive nature of reasonable accommodation and the lack of precedent 
might help explain why many judges have, at the summary judgment stage, focused more 
on the question of whether a plaintiff is disabled and less on whether the accommodation 
sought was reasonable. Reasonable-accommodation issues simply are not easily decided 
at summary judgment. See Stein, 53 Duke L J at 90–96 (cited in note 121). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone, and David B. Wilkins, Book Review, 
Cause Lawyering for People with Disabilities, 123 Harv L Rev 1658, 1699–1701 (2010) 
(noting that in over two decades of ADA jurisprudence, there is only one employment case 
“defining the contours of reasonable accommodation despite the lack of clear statutory 
guidance”). Some of the unwillingness to resolve open accommodations issues may flow 
from the fact that the EEOC has historically been the entity to provide most of the specific 
accommodations guidance through its regulations. There is also the possibility that the 
medical-model mindset that accompanied the Rehabilitation Act is still strong, and pre-
vents some judges from seeing the social solution of accommodations—instead of a medical 
solution—as what people with disabilities really need. See Stein and Stein, 58 Hastings L 
J at 1207–08 (cited in note 57) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act furthered the medical 
model of disability through “determining that individuals are disabled due to ‘special’ med-
ical problems and were therefore dependent on social services and institutions”). See also 
Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 192–209 (cited in note 119) (discussing the modern-day entrench-
ment of the medical model of disability in both the media and federal court jurisprudence). 
 139 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Humiston-Keel-
ing, Inc, 227 F3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir 2000); Smith, 180 F3d at 1167–68. 
 140 Bagenstos, Disability Rights Law at 92–93 (cited in note 129). 
 141 See, for example, Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F3d 
538, 544 (7th Cir 1995). 
 142 See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
85 Ind L J 187, 222 (2010). 
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employees and customers, should those benefits be considered as 
well?143 For costs, should courts consider nonmonetary costs, such 
as costs to employer autonomy and coworker morale?144 The 
ADAAA does nothing to address these questions or otherwise fur-
ther demarcate the bounds of reasonable accommodation. 
Keeping the bar relatively high for securing an accommoda-
tion was part of the political compromise necessary to achieve the 
ADAAA’s passage.145 In the course of negotiations, the disability 
community had argued that the bar for proving one had a disabil-
ity should be lower; people with impairments should be protected 
from discrimination no matter the severity of that impairment.146 
The business community acquiesced to this argument, but with a 
catch. They agreed to lower the bar for discrimination claims, al-
lowing people with disabilities to bring a discrimination claim un-
der the “regarded as” prong without requiring a showing of limi-
tation on bodily functions.147 However, the business community 
did not believe it should be required to provide an accommodation 
for people with nonsevere impairments (in other words, those that 
do not substantially limit one or more major life activities).148 In 
enacting the ADAAA, Congress therefore coupled the expansion 
of the definition of disability with the provision that plaintiffs un-
der the “regarded as” prong were not entitled to accommodations, 
reasoning that anyone who needed accommodation to realize 
work capability would be able to qualify under either the first or 
second prong of the definition.149 
Perhaps the greatest conundrum occasioned by the ADA’s 
statutory language and scope, as far as including work-capable 
 
 143 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U Pa L Rev 839, 842–
43 (2008) (raising this question). 
 144 See Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict between Disabled 
Employees and Their Coworkers, 34 Fla St U L Rev 313, 315 (2007) (proposing “an amend-
ment to the ADA that clearly defines an employer’s obligation to accommodate a disabled 
employee even though the accommodation conflicts with the rights of other employees”). 
 145 See generally 2008 and the ADA Amendments Act, Archive ADA: The Path to 
Equality (Georgetown Law), online at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada 
/#ADAAA (visited May 21, 2014). This site is then-Professor Chai Feldblum’s legislative 
history website, which includes all of the legislative history leading up to the passage of 
the ADA Amendments Act.  
 146 Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can 
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 Berkeley J Emp & Labor L 203, 262–63 (2010). 
 147 Id at 264. 
 148 Id at 263–64. 
 149 Statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 340, the Americans with Disabilities 
Amendments Act of 2008, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, in 154 Cong Rec S 8346–47 (daily ed Sept 
11, 2008) (Statement of Senate Managers). 
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persons with impairments in the workforce through its accommo-
dation mandate, has been created by the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretive jurisprudence.150 The Court has promoted a gatekeeping 
function, both through an overly parsimonious interpretation of 
statutory language (for example, severity of disability)151 and 
through gratuitous and constricting glosses on issues not raised 
by litigants (notably, weighing the possibility of mitigating 
measures).152 The ADAAA explicitly repealed each of these ap-
proaches, yet the inability of the Court to resolve the tension be-
tween work capability and disability status remains a critical 
problem. Part III explores further how this conceptual divide ap-
pears to persist in early ADAAA case law. 
No ADA employment-discrimination suit brought before the 
Supreme Court (prior to the ADAAA) achieved victory, and every 
case involved persons with impairments who were both work ca-
pable and seeking to retain their employment.153 Claimants in 
 
 150 Silvers and Stein, 35 U Mich J L Ref at 115–23 (cited in note 36) (surveying recent 
decisions by the Court and suggesting that it “may continue to draw sharp lines between 
species-typical and biologically anomalous people regardless of technological, social, and 
legal changes that permit disabled people to achieve the capabilities long practiced by the 
nondisabled”). 
 151 Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 212–18, 222–23 (cited in note 119) (canvassing the various 
ways federal courts have provided narrow answers to the threshold question of whether 
someone has a “disability” under the ADA). 
 152 See Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 628–29 n 205 (cited in note 22) (discussing the pos-
sibility that the Supreme Court’s consideration of mitigating measures in Sutton v United 
Air Lines, Inc, 527 US 471 (1999), if broadly construed, could “be understood as raising a 
duty to mitigate one’s disability”). 
 153 See, for example, Chevron USA, Inc v Echazabal, 536 US 73, 85–86 (2002) (finding 
that despite the employee’s ability and willingness to work, the employer could, pursuant 
to an EEOC regulation, refuse to hire him for fear of endangering his existing health dis-
ability without running afoul of the ADA); US Airways, Inc v Barnett, 535 US 391, 403–
06 (2002) (holding that, without a showing of special circumstances by the employee, the 
employer is not required to make accommodations in contravention of an established sen-
iority system); Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc v Williams, 534 US 184, 201 
(2002) (holding that the employee’s inability to perform certain duties required of her po-
sition did not render her disabled under the ADA, and thus no accommodation was re-
quired); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 360 (2001) 
(holding that the employees’ claims for money damages against the state for discrimina-
tion under the ADA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Albertson’s, Inc v Kirking-
burg, 527 US 555, 564–67 (1999) (declining to find the employee disabled by monocular 
vision because the condition constituted a mere inability rather than a “disability” under 
the ADA); Murphy v United Parcel Service, Inc, 527 US 516, 521 (1999) (holding the claim-
ant was not “disabled” by high blood pressure because it could be mitigated by medication 
so that he was employable in alternative fields of work); Sutton, 527 US at 492–94 (holding 
that the job applicants’ poor vision did not render them “disabled” even if it resulted in 
preclusion from a particular position). 
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Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc,154 were nearsighted pilots deemed 
work-capable to fly regional aircraft, but not to pilot long-haul 
flights;155 plaintiffs in Murphy v United Parcel Service, Inc156 and 
Albertson’s, Inc v Kirkingburg,157 were functionally capable truck 
drivers with high blood pressure and monocular vision, respec-
tively, whose employers were not required to continue their until-
then acceptable employment via use of available regulatory waiv-
ers;158 Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett159 
did not raise an accommodation request—although the Court con-
strued it as such—but rather involved a nurse returning from 
breast cancer treatment who sought reinstatement to her hospital 
job, and a prison guard allergic to cigarette smoke who saw his 
performance evaluations drop after filing a discrimination 
claim;160 US Airways, Inc v Barnett161 involved an airline baggage 
handler with a back condition seeking job reassignment to the 
company mailroom;162 and Chevron USA, Inc v Echazabal163 ruled 
that a sixteen-year oil-refinery worker, who had been knowingly 
exposed to toxic chemicals as a temporary employee while receiv-
ing good performance marks, was unqualified to be retained as a 
permanent employee by the same company because he tested pos-
itive for hepatitis C and thus would be a danger to himself.164 
The Court’s inability to embrace the notion that disability in-
volves impairment but that persons with disabilities can be capa-
ble workers is most clearly seen in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
 
 154 527 US 471 (1999).  
 155 Id at 475–76 (noting that the employer terminated applicants’ interviews after 
discovering they did not meet the employer’s heightened standard of “uncorrected visual 
acuity of 20/100 or better” for pilots). 
 156 527 US 516 (1999). 
 157 527 US 555 (1999). 
 158 Murphy, 527 US at 520 (discussing how after being erroneously certified to drive 
commercially when hired, an employee was fired one month later on the employer’s “belief” 
that the employee’s blood pressure “exceeded the DOT’s requirements”); Albertson’s, 527 
US at 560 (describing that an employee was fired for failing to meet the Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) vision requirements and not rehired despite employee obtaining a 
waiver from the DOT). 
 159 531 US 356 (2001). 
 160 Id at 362 (noting that a nurse was forced into taking a lower-paying position at the 
hospital and that a security guard’s performance evaluations lowered after filing a claim 
with the EEOC). 
 161 535 US 391 (2002). 
 162 Id at 394 (describing how the worker was displaced from the job by another em-
ployee through the employer’s seniority-based employee bidding system). 
 163 536 US 73 (2002).  
 164 Id at 76 (stating that the employee suffered from hepatitis C, which the employer’s 
doctors concluded would be exacerbated through continued employment).  
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Kentucky, Inc v Williams.165 Ella Williams, who worked at 
Toyota’s Kentucky car-manufacturing site, developed repetitive-
stress disorders that restricted the amount of weight she could lift 
and the scope of activities in which she could engage. As a work-
place accommodation, Toyota reassigned her to a “Quality Control 
Inspection Operations (QCIO)” team and limited her work to two 
of the four inspection functions, which allowed Williams to keep 
working.166 However, upon a change of management strategy Wil-
liams became required, along with all other QCIO employees, to 
carry out all four standard functions, including the two she was 
physically unable to perform, and she was dismissed from em-
ployment.167 The Court ruled that Williams was not sufficiently 
disabled to merit disability status under the ADA. Although Wil-
liams was substantially limited in a number of major life activi-
ties, she was not sufficiently limited in her abilities.168 To merit 
ADA protection, the Justices reasoned, Williams would have to be 
restricted in a broader range of tasks—even though her impair-
ments kept her from performing all the designated work func-
tions.169 In other words, Williams was not disabled enough to 
merit disability status, but was, according to the Court, too im-
paired to work without a proven and effective accommodation.170 
 
 165 534 US 184, 201 (2002). 
 166 Id at 188–89 (noting that Williams was initially limited to “assembly paint” and 
“paint second inspection”). 
 167 Id at 188–90 (explaining that her duties expanded to include “shell body audit” 
and “ED surface repair”). 
 168 Id at 202: 
[H]er medical conditions caused her to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occa-
sionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her children, 
gardens, and drives long distances. . . . But these changes in her life did not 
amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that are of central importance 
to most people’s daily lives that they establish a manual task disability as a 
matter of law. 
 169 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, 534 US at 202 (noting that Williams could 
still “brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laun-
dry, and pick up around the house”). 
 170 For critical analyses of the Court’s holding, see, for example, Lisa Eichhorn, The 
Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing around the EEOC’s “Disability” Reg-
ulations under the ADA, 39 Wake Forest L Rev 177, 200, 202 (2004) (suggesting the Court 
“sidestepped” EEOC regulations by giving itself “license to ignore applicable regulatory 
language and to substitute its own language to reflect the so-called plain meaning of stat-
utory terms”); Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled 
Neutrality Claims, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1285, 1317 (2003) (stating that “[a]fter knocking 
down a strawperson . . . the Court used its selective smattering of dictionary definitions 
as sole support for a major logical leap”). 
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The ADAAA clarifies that for purposes of remedying disabil-
ity discrimination, disability is to be broadly construed and attrib-
utions of disability should thus be afforded a wide scope. Part III 
explores the potential impact of the ADAAA and considers how to 
prevent reversion to a strict construal of disability. Part III will 
introduce our proposal, which is explored further in Part V, that 
in order to avert such retrogression courts’ primary emphasis 
should be on the effectiveness of an accommodation rather than 
the disabilities or capabilities of the worker. 
III.  THE ADAAA 
The ADAAA stipulation that disability is to be broadly con-
strued, together with its explicit rejection of the Sutton and Wil-
liams decisions, might seem to open statutory protections to a far 
broader range of plaintiffs. Indeed, initial indications are that 
ADAAA plaintiffs are more likely to survive motions for summary 
judgment based on the claim that they are insufficiently disabled 
to warrant statutory protection. However, if the only result is to 
shift judgments of qualifications from the determination of disa-
bility to other aspects of the plaintiff’s prima facie case—either 
the determination that the plaintiff is qualified with or without 
accommodation or the determination that the plaintiff suffered 
discrimination as a result of disability—the promise of the 
ADAAA may prove illusory. This Part presents some of the early 
case law under the ADAAA and explores whether there are early 
indications of backsliding. This Part will also foreshadow our ar-
gument that the emphasis should be on the efficacy of accommo-
dations rather than characteristics of the person with disabilities 
seen in abstraction from the circumstances of the job. This Part 
will also show why excluding persons who qualify under the re-
garded-as prong from having a right to accommodation is poten-
tially problematic. 
A. Construing Disability Expansively 
As of July 2013, federal appellate courts had not yet ruled in 
sufficient numbers for analysis of the construction of disability in 
cases arising after the ADAAA. Circuits that have dealt with the 
question are unanimous that the ADAAA does not apply retroac-
tively.171 A number of these cases also state explicitly that the 
 
 171 See generally, for example, Hetherington v Wal-Mart, Inc, 511 Fed Appx 909 (11th 
Cir 2013); Reynolds v American National Red Cross, 701 F3d 143 (4th Cir 2012); Wurzel v 
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ADAAA analysis of the construction of disability would differ 
from the earlier ADA analysis.172 
Quite a few district courts have ruled on the construction of 
disability in post-ADAAA cases, however. In these cases, plain-
tiffs have fared markedly better than pre-ADAAA plaintiffs on 
the determination of whether they met the initial requirement for 
a prima facie case, being a person with a disability under the 
terms of the statute. In the first six months of 2013, thirty-eight 
courts ruled on the issue of whether the plaintiff was a person 
with a disability under the ADAAA.173 In thirty-one of these cases, 
the plaintiff survived a motion for summary judgment or a motion 
to dismiss on the disability-status issue. Cases in which plaintiffs 
did not prevail on disability-status claims included a two-week 
episode of kidney stones,174 planned arthroscopic knee surgery 
with a recovery period of less than six months,175 a knee injury 
that resolved before the end of the plaintiff’s FMLA leave,176 and 
mild Tourette’s syndrome in which the plaintiff had asserted to 
the EEOC that he was completely functional.177 Several of these 
cases reflect the ADAAA provision178 that transitory and minor 
impairments—impairments with a duration of six months or 
less—do not come within the regarded-as prong of the disability 
definition.179 Others rest on the failure to assert facts about the 
plaintiff’s condition with any specificity.180 Nevertheless, in still 
others there are clear echoes of the earlier congressionally re-
jected181 Supreme Court holding182 that to satisfy the regarded-as 
 
Whirlpool Corp, 482 Fed Appx 1 (6th Cir 2012); Lander v ABF Freight System, 459 Fed 
Appx 89 (3d Cir 2012); Hodges v ISP Technologies, Inc, 427 Fed Appx 337 (5th Cir 2011).  
 172 Lander, 459 Fed Appx at 92; Reynolds, 701 F3d at 152; Wurzel, 482 Fed Appx at 
10. 
 173 Data were compiled from a LEXIS search of “ADAAA and disability and employ-
ment” and are on file with the author. 
 174 Clay v Campbell County Sheriff’s Office, 2013 WL 3245153, *3 (WD Va). 
 175 Tramp v Associated Underwriters, Inc, 2013 WL 3071258, *6–7 (D Neb). The firm 
in this case was undergoing a reduction in force (RIF) because of continuing losses. The 
plaintiff claims that she was subject to the RIF because she was over sixty-five and the 
employer had realized that health premiums would be lower if she shifted from the em-
ployer’s plan to Medicare, which she had refused to do. Id at *1–3, 5.  
 176 Martinez v City of Weslaco Texas, 2013 WL 2951060, *9–10 (SD Tex). 
 177 McBride v Amer Technology, Inc, 2013 WL 2541595, *5 (WD Tex). 
 178 42 USC § 12102. 
 179 See, for example, Martinez, 2013 WL 2951060 at *9. 
 180 See, for example, Phelps v Balfour, Commemorative Brands Inc, 2013 WL 653542, 
*5–6 (WD Ky); Mecca v Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc, 2013 WL 136212, *2–3 (MD 
Fla). 
 181 42 USC § 12101(a)(4). 
 182 Sutton v United Air Lines, 527 US 471 (1999). 
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prong plaintiffs must show the defendant regarded them as sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity.183 
Qualifying as a person with a disability is only the first, 
threshold step for plaintiffs in making the prima facie case of dis-
crimination requisite to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
Nonetheless, it has been the critical stopping point for disability-
discrimination plaintiffs, preventing them from presenting the re-
mainder of their case. The other two elements of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case (in the absence of direct evidence of discrimina-
tion) are that the plaintiff was qualified for the position, with or 
without accommodations, and that the plaintiff experienced the 
adverse action as a result of disability. These elements of the 
prima facie case may be more difficult to dismiss on motions for 
summary judgment, as they likely involve disputed claims about 
the facts.184 Plaintiffs surviving motions for summary judgment 
on the issue of disability may therefore obtain bargaining ad-
vantages in litigation that were not present when their cases were 
routinely dismissed on the basis that they did not come within the 
definition of disability. On the other hand, there are some signals 
in the case law to date that the problematic picture of judicial ap-
proaches to disability we have portrayed above may be shifting 
from the determination on summary judgment of disability to the 
determination on summary judgment of qualifications and causa-
tion, the other elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 
B. Other Elements of the Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 
Plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of discrimination must pre-
sent a prima facie case under the ADA that includes not only ev-
idence of disability, but also evidence that they were qualified for 
the position and that they were treated adversely on the basis of 
 
 183 See, for example, O’Donnell v Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 2013 WL 1234813, 
*7, 18 (ED Pa): 
Thus, even under the “regarded as disabled” rubric, a plaintiff is still required 
to plead the existence of a substantial limitation on a major life activity, either 
because the employer mistakenly believed he had a nonexistent impairment that 
caused one, or because the employer believed an actual impairment caused one, 
when it in fact did not. 
Other courts construe the ADAAA in accord with Congress’s intent. See, for example, Ki-
niropoulos v Northampton County Child Welfare Service, 917 F Supp 2d 377, 385 (ED Pa 
2013). 
 184 See, for example, Snider v United States Steel-Fairfield Works Medical Depart-
ment, 2013 WL 1278973, *4 (ND Ala). 
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disability.185 The burden then shifts to the defendant to produce 
evidence contesting one or more elements of the prima facie case, 
and then potentially back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that 
the defendant’s assertions were pretextual.186 All along, the plain-
tiff bears the burden of persuasion on all elements of the case.187 
If the primary result of plaintiffs surviving motions for summary 
judgment on the question of disability is only that they lose on 
summary judgment on the other elements of the prima facie case, 
little will have been gained by the ADAAA reassertion of an ex-
panded understanding of disability. There are some indications 
in the early case law that this could occur; if so, it may replicate 
the mistakes of the earlier jurisprudence in regard to a different 
element of the case. 
1. Qualifications. 
In several cases, plaintiffs have prevailed on the determina-
tion of disability only to lose on summary judgment on the deter-
mination of whether they were qualified for the position sought. 
For example, in one of the few appellate cases decided under the 
ADAAA, the plaintiff did not survive summary judgment on the 
issue of qualifications. Jeffery Knutson was a Location General 
Manager of a depot for frozen food deliveries.188 The position de-
scription required him to be Department of Transportation (DOT) 
certified to drive trucks weighing over ten thousand pounds. All 
parties agreed that his performance was excellent until he re-
ceived a penetrating eye injury in 2008.189 After the injury, he was 
unable to obtain the required DOT medical clearance and was ul-
timately dismissed. The trial court accepted, at the summary 
judgment stage, the employer’s contention that the DOT certifi-
cation was an essential function of the manager position because 
sales managers must drive trucks at times, even though Knutson 
presented evidence that he had continued to perform the position 
satisfactorily and that driving a ten-thousand-pound truck was 
rarely necessary for his position.190 The court also accepted at face 
 
 185 See Monette v Electronic Data Systems Corp, 90 F3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir 1996).  
 186 Id. 
 187 Id at 1186–87. 
 188 Knutson v Schwan’s Home Service, Inc, 711 F3d 911, 913 (8th Cir 2013). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id at 914–15. It is worth noting that the EEOC has recently affirmed that it is the 
employer’s prerogative to decide what are, and are not, essential functions of the job. Kevin 
P. McGowan, EEOC’s Views on Accommodation under Amended ADA Discussed, Bulletin 
05 STEIN_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2014  11:11 AM 
2014] Accommodating Every Body 723 
 
value the employer’s contention that it was not a reasonable ac-
commodation to reassign these duties to other employees because 
the employer had defined DOT certification as an essential job 
function.191 The court concluded that the employer had engaged in 
the requisite interactive process regarding accommodations by 
telling plaintiff that he could either pass the DOT certification or 
seek reassignment to a vacant position if any were available.192 
The appellate court affirmed these rulings by the district court. 
Cases such as this one, which credit rather than contest the em-
ployer’s definition of qualifications and essential job functions, 
continue the jurisprudential approach of cases such as Albert-
son’s193 that exclude work-capable individuals from positions in 
which they have performed and continue to perform well. Early 
empirical work on the ADAAA confirms that there is already an 
enhanced focus on qualification status and that it may indeed be 
functioning as a new way for courts to summarily dispense of 
cases before reaching the merits of alleged discrimination.194 
2. Causation. 
An additional element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is ev-
idence that any adverse action was taken on the basis of disabil-
ity. In employment-discrimination cases without direct evidence 
of discrimination, the issue of what is required to demonstrate a 
nexus between membership in the protected class and discrimi-
nation has been vexed. Some courts insisted on but-for causa-
tion—a standard that is very difficult for plaintiffs to meet—while 
other courts insisted only on evidence that membership in the 
protected class was a relevant factor in the plaintiff’s treatment.195 
The difference is significant: in cases in which the plaintiff alleges 
 
to Management (Bloomberg BNA Jan 10, 2012), online at http://www.bna.com/eeocs-views 
-accommodation-n12884906922 (visited May 21, 2014). 
 191 Knutson, 711 F3d at 916. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Albertson’s, 527 US 555. 
 194 See, for example, Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes 
under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 2027, 2065–66 (2013), observing 
that  
at least two post-amendment court of appeals decisions have affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment for the employer based on the plaintiff’s lack of ability to 
perform the essential functions of the job, even though the lower court rulings 
were based on a finding that the plaintiff was not disabled. The issue of disabil-
ity, the basis for the district court’s rulings, was not addressed by these appellate 
courts on appeal. 
 195 Pinkerton v Spellings, 529 F3d 513, 517–18 (5th Cir 2008). 
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multiple bases for discrimination or in cases in which there is 
both credible evidence of discrimination and credible evidence of 
reasonable bases for adverse action (such as the plaintiff’s perfor-
mance or the employer’s economic circumstances), plaintiffs will 
be unable to demonstrate but-for causation. Both causal language 
and remedies tied to a particular causal showing vary in the dif-
ferent civil rights statutes, so it is difficult to draw inferences from 
one statute to another or predict when courts will do so. In Uni-
versity of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar,196 a deci-
sion handed down at the end of its 2013 term, the Supreme Court 
ruled that but-for causation is the requirement for claims of re-
taliation under Title VII, in which the statutory language re-
mains “because of” membership in the protected class.197 What the 
Nassar ruling will portend for the ADA is unknown. The ADAAA 
amended the statutory causation language in the antidiscrimina-
tion section of the ADA to change “because of” disability198 to “on 
the basis of” disability.199 There is no “motivating factor” language 
in the ADA. As with Title VII, however, Congress left the “be-
cause” causation language in the antiretaliation section of the 
ADA.200 Moreover, the remedy section of the ADA still incorpo-
rates the remedy sections of Title VII by reference.201 
In several post-ADAAA cases, courts have refused to grant 
motions for summary judgment for employers on the causation 
question.202 In others, courts, while apparently interpreting cau-
sation broadly,203 have still granted summary judgment for de-
fendants. For example, in Cody v Prairie Ethanol, LLC,204 the 
court, after concluding that Brice Cody had presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment on whether disability was 
a motivating factor in his treatment, immediately concluded that 
evidence of Cody’s performance problems was sufficient to shift 
 
 196 133 S Ct 2517 (2013). 
 197 Id at 2534. Congress had specifically amended the antidiscrimination section of 
Title VII to provide that plaintiffs could prevail when they could show that discrimination 
was a motivating factor in the defendant’s action. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub L No 
102-166, 105 Stat 1071, 1075, codified at 42 USC § 2000e–2(m). Plaintiff’s remedies in 
such cases are also limited if the employer could show that it would have taken the same 
action absent the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class. 42 USC § 2000e–5(g)(2). 
 198 ADAAA § 5, 122 Stat at 3557, codified at 42 USC § 12112(a). 
 199 42 USC § 12112(a). 
 200 42 USC § 12203(a). 
 201 42 USC § 12117(a). 
 202 See, for example, Mercer v Arbor E & T, LLC, 2013 WL 164107, *14 (SD Tex). 
 203 See, for example, Cody v Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 2013 WL 3246109, *6 (D SD). 
 204 2013 WL 3246109 (D SD).  
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the burden back to Cody to demonstrate that the employer’s as-
serted reasons were merely pretextual.205 Because Cody could not 
do this, his ADA claim was dismissed on summary judgment.206 
The court reasoned that even though Cody had evidence that dis-
crimination was a motivating factor, the burden shifted back to 
him to prove pretext when the employer advanced a legitimate 
reason for his termination. In so doing, the court effectively un-
dercut Cody’s ability to contest the extent to which discrimination 
had motivated his employer. Other cases at the district-court 
level similarly illustrate this concern. For example, a police officer 
trainee who had difficulty passing fitness tests due to a blood con-
dition prevailed on summary judgment on the claim that he was 
actually disabled, but lost on the issues of whether he was quali-
fied or whether lighter-duty assignments were a reasonable ac-
commodation.207 
On the other hand, some cases are more encouraging from 
the perspective of placing the emphasis on the efficacy of accom-
modations rather than on the employee’s qualifications. For ex-
ample, a night dispatcher at a county’s emergency-dispatch cen-
ter was experiencing health difficulties because of diabetes that 
affected his performance.208 His physician recommended regular 
sleep habits—not consistent with the night shift—as a way of ad-
dressing these conditions.209 When the employee requested trans-
fer to a (lower-paying) day shift as an accommodation, the em-
ployer refused.210 The employer reasoned that because there were 
other methods for addressing plaintiff’s condition—such as 
 
 205 Id at *8–9. 
 206 Id at *9–10. 
 207 Lapier v Prince George’s County, Maryland, 2013 WL 497971, *3–4 (D Md). See 
also Banaszak v Ten Sixteen Recovery Network, 2013 WL 2623882, *5–6 (ED Mich) (in-
volving a plaintiff fired because she didn’t follow the employer’s call-off procedure for ab-
sences); Tate v Sam’s East, Inc, 2013 WL 1320634, *12–13 (ED Tenn) (finding the em-
ployer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the job reassignment was “merely pretext 
for its true discriminatory intent”); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Product 
Fabricators, Inc, 2013 WL 1104731, *7–8 (D Minn) (concluding that the plaintiff would 
lose on causation and not reaching the issue of disability as a result); Goodman v YRC, 
Inc, 2013 WL 1180872, *11 (SD Ind) (concluding that an economically motivated reduction 
in force was a legitimate reason for termination). Against these cases there is really good 
discussion about the reasonableness of accommodations, in a case in which the plaintiff 
survived summary judgment on all elements of the prima facie case, Gregor v Polar Sem-
iconductor, Inc, 2013 WL 588743, *4–5 (D Minn). 
 208 Szarawara v County of Montgomery, 2013 WL 3230691, *1 (ED Pa). 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id at *2. 
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weight loss or exercise—a transfer was not a reasonable accom-
modation.211 The court denied defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment. In so doing, the court refused to assume that the em-
ployer’s job description settled the question of what were essential 
job functions.212 The court also determined that the question to be 
resolved at trial was the effectiveness of the accommodation 
plaintiff had suggested in enabling him to perform the job and 
maintain his health.213 
C. “Regarded As” Plaintiffs 
The case law also suggests the increased importance of the 
regarded-as prong for plaintiffs in surviving motions for summary 
judgment on the question of disability. For example, in Mengel v 
Reading Eagle Co,214 the plaintiff had partial hearing loss and bal-
ance problems due to surgery for a brain tumor.215 Although the 
court concluded that under its ADAAA case law partial hearing 
loss in one ear was insufficient for a finding of actual disability, 
absent additional evidence of a substantial limit on a major life 
activity, the court also ruled that plaintiff could meet the re-
garded-as standard for disability because the defendant was 
aware of her physical limitations.216 However, as described above, 
the plaintiff failed another aspect of the prima facie case, the es-
tablishment that the adverse action was on the basis of her disa-
bility.217 The defendant-employer was undergoing a reduction in 
force, and the plaintiff received the lowest scores in her depart-
ment despite her satisfactory employment ratings. The scoring 
system included work quality, versatility, interpersonal/team-
work skills, productivity, disciplinary record, performance evalu-
ations, and tenure with the company.218 It is plausible that Chris-
tine Mengel would have fared better on an accommodated 
evaluation matrix, or that ratings on factors such as versatility 
could have been affected by accommodations in Mengel’s work re-
sponsibilities. However, these possibilities are precluded for a 
plaintiff qualifying as disabled only under the regarded-as prong. 
 
 211 Id at *4. 
 212 Szarawara, 2013 WL 3230691 at *3. 
 213 Id at *4. 
 214 2013 WL 1285477 (ED Pa). For similar cases, see generally Goodman, 2013 WL 
1180872 (SD Ind); Kiniropoulos, 917 F Supp 2d 377. 
 215 Mengel, 2013 WL 1285477 at *1. 
 216 Id at *4. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id at *1. 
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As an illustration, other plaintiffs claiming actual disability have 
survived motions for summary judgment on their qualifications 
with accommodations, despite losing on summary judgment on 
regarded-as claims for accommodations.219 
Similarly, Professor Stephen Befort’s recent empirical work 
on the ADAAA shows that, despite the lowered threshold for “re-
garded as” coverage, the prevalence of “regarded as” summary 
judgment determinations following the effective date of the 
ADAAA has not increased.220 He notes, as one explanatory possi-
bility, “that post-amendment plaintiffs may be deterred from as-
serting a prong three claim due to the need for a reasonable ac-
commodation in order to be able to perform the essential functions 
of the job.”221 
Accordingly, the argument this Article develops below in re-
gard to whether an employer should be obligated to make an ac-
commodation focuses not on the eligibility of the individual, but 
on the effectiveness of the accommodation. Under this proposal, 
making the accommodation should be the default, though for the 
employer to be obligated to provide the accommodation there 
must be some element of the job for which the employee requires 
the accommodation (for example, having to stand to operate office 
equipment, or getting information over the phone), and the sug-
gested accommodation must be effective.222 
In sum, even after the hard-fought-for ADAAA, disability- 
discrimination jurisprudence may still fail to offer a progressive 
view of workplace accommodations, thus continuing to put at risk 
Congress’s goal of keeping work-capable people working despite 
disability. At the conceptual level, the conflict between thinking 
of disabled people as work capable and as work incapacitated ap-
pears to remain unresolved, with the recipe for the requisite bal-
ancing yet to be mastered. Also, misreading the right to reasona-
ble accommodation, as an entitlement of productivity-deficient 
people, may persist. Accommodation should not be thought of as 
compensation for suffering from disability. Accommodation rem-
edies discrimination, whether advertent or unintentional, in 
workplace arrangements. Accommodation is warranted if disabil-
 
 219 See, for example, Perdick v City of Allentown, 2013 WL 3231162, *3–4 (ED Pa). 
 220 Befort, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev at 2063 (cited in note 194). 
 221 Id. 
 222 See Part V. 
05 STEIN_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2014  11:11 AM 
728  The University of Chicago Law Review [81:689 
   
ity bias in policies, practices, or the physical plant needlessly de-
nies disabled people equality of opportunity in the workplace.223 
Part IV discusses why conceptualizing workplace accommodation 
as a service or compensatory benefit for being disabled is prob-
lematic. 
IV.  COMPLEXITIES OF DISABILITY IDENTITY 
Connecting the appropriateness of offering accommodation to 
the degree of an individual’s disability presupposes that the line 
that marks the necessary level of dysfunction is sufficiently bright 
to serve as a sustainable, steady, and objective standard.224 Only 
if this is so can an eligibility criterion for accommodation be ap-
plied fairly and cost-effectively; it is neither fair nor justifiable to 
force claimants to prove their worthiness for accommodations if 
the standard for doing so is not sufficiently clear or reliable. Yet 
the extensive history of disability policy suggests that there is no 
reliably bright line. 
A. The Health-Services Model of Accommodation 
The dilemmas encountered by health-care and benefits pro-
grams, which rely on there being an objective, fair, and cost-effec-
tive standard of sufficiently severe disability, suggest that the 
possibility of such a steadfast standard is fatally flawed. The 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) efforts to define disease and 
disability illustrate the problem. Very broadly, the WHO idea of 
disability is any restriction or lack (resulting from any impair-
ment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or with the 
ease considered normal for a human being.225 For the WHO, disa-
bled people include those who are currently limited or who may 
 
 223 See generally Silvers, Wasserman, and Mahowald, Disability, Difference, Discrim-
ination (cited in note 26). 
 224 See Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 374 (cited in note 108):  
Blindness, deafness, disordered eating, and intellectual impairments all repre-
sent a range of qualities and/or abilities regarding certain aspects of the body. 
Who is blind, deaf, bulimic, or mentally retarded is thus a question of degree 
based on graduated differences. At some point on each continuum, a line must 
be drawn to effectuate the diagnosis. 
 225 See World Health Organization, World Report on Disability 4 (2011), online at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240685215_eng.pdf (visited May 21, 
2014) (defining “disability” as an “umbrella term for impairments, activity limitations and 
participation restrictions”). 
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be so limited in the future due to a current condition, such as a 
genetic predisposition to a disease.226 
Trying to turn the meaning of disability into a criterion for 
the assignment of rights immediately initiates several debates 
that are difficult to resolve. One so deeply divisive as to be, per-
haps, irresolvable arises from disagreement about differentiating 
pathological from normal manners of performing various activi-
ties. From a cultural perspective, the ways in which daily life ac-
tivities are performed vary from place to place and time to time. 
What counts as serious dysfunction at one time or in one place 
may thus be intransient, and be seen as only negligibly limiting 
in the future or in another locale.227 From a biological perspective, 
the definition of disability may make a life-stage difference such 
as infertility—the inability to reproduce—a disability by fiat. Yet 
whether infertility is a disability, rather than just a biological 
state of a minority of young adults and of a majority of small chil-
dren and elders that is within the range of normality, is regularly 
disputed in the context of disagreements over whether such indi-
viduals should be eligible for reproductive-technology services.228 
The WHO approach to defining disability was the result of a 
lengthy process of attempting to attain global agreement to serve 
the practice of medicine’s clinical needs, but the effort put into 
crafting a global standard for medical-services eligibility seems 
more like a stopgap than a solid solution. The WHO’s Interna-
tional Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) 
originally was compiled, under the title of International Classifi-
cation of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps (ICIDH), as a 
complement to the WHO’s International Classification of Dis-
eases (ICD).229 Originating in something like its current form at 
the end of the nineteenth century, the ICD is a reporting system 
of morbidity and mortality causes for populations and diagnostic 
 
 226 Id at 7–8. 
 227 See, for example, Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 368 (cited in note 108) (explor-
ing the transience of certain conditions, such as eating disorders, that “exist or have ex-
isted only at certain times and in certain places”). 
 228 Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 5 NYU J Leg & Pub Pol 189, 190 (2001). 
 229 World Health Organization, International Classification of Impairments, Disabil-
ities, and Handicaps: A Manual of Classification Relating to the Consequences of Disease 
(1980; reprint 1993), online at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1980 
/9241541261_eng.pdf (visited May 21, 2014). See also Resolution 54.21, International Clas-
sification of Functioning, Disability and Health, Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly 
(May 22, 2001), online at http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA54/ea54r21.pdf 
(visited May 21, 2014) (adopting the second edition of the ICIDH and titling it as the ICF). 
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groups.230 ICD revisions have been propelled by advances in med-
ical knowledge, as well as by alterations in national and global 
health systems’ clinical and policy-making needs. The ICIDH was 
initiated in 1980 to classify disabling health-related functional 
limitations, to serve as an instrument in the WHO’s effort to 
measure the health of populations, as well as to systematize treat-
ment planning and monitoring, goal setting, and outcomes assess-
ment for preventative health and therapeutic policies around the 
globe.231 
After a decade of trying to put the ICIDH into use in an era 
when disabled people were pursuing political liberation, the WHO 
undertook a revision that proved so contentious and complex that 
almost another decade passed before approval of the new classifi-
cation scheme that became the current ICF.232 The ICF revises the 
definition of human limitations that constitute disabilities, and 
consequently alters the identification of humans functionally lim-
ited by disabilities, by adopting a multivariant account of inter-
secting biological and social factors.233 
Consider how the instability of this global delineation of dis-
ability is inimical to a reliable ADA-type program of righting the 
wrongs of disability discrimination. Individuals in the same bio-
logical condition may be substantially limited or not, depending 
on a multiplicity of biological and social variables that affect func-
tionality. As situations change, individuals whose deficits once 
counted as mere differences may be categorized as disabled, or 
the functional impact of deficits that previously assigned individ-
uals to the disability category may recede. If the ADA were to de-
termine disability status according to the global disability 
scheme, however, politics and changes in social norms might still 
impede effective disability classification. For example, an individ-
 
 230 The ICD is currently in its tenth revision, with the eleventh scheduled for 2015. 
See World Health Organization, International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Information 
Sheet (World Health Organization), online at http://www.who.int/classifications/icd 
/factsheet/en/index.html (visited May 21, 2014). 
 231 WHO, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps at 
1 (cited in note 229). See also World Health Organization, ICF Application Areas, online 
at http://www.who.int/classifications/icf/appareas/en/index.html (visited May 21, 2014). 
 232 See Resolution 54.21 (cited in note 229); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleido-
scope, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 621, 646–47 (1999) (comparing and contrasting the first and 
second editions). 
 233 See WHO, World Report on Disability at 5 (cited in note 225) (“The ICF emphasizes 
environmental factors in creating disability, which is the main difference between this 
new classification and the previous [ICIDH].”). 
05 STEIN_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2014  11:11 AM 
2014] Accommodating Every Body 731 
 
ual could be accommodated due to a medical condition that is clas-
sified as a disability, and could work successfully for several 
years, but lose the accommodation and thereby the ability to exe-
cute an essential function of the job, because new revisions to 
global health-care policy now deem people with the condition not 
disabled, but merely regarded as disabled. Alternatively, individ-
uals with the same biological condition might initially be granted 
only the protection of the “regarded as” prong and thus denied 
accommodation, but subsequent global categorizations might be 
altered to label the condition as a disability. 
The revolutionary transition from ICIDH to ICF is by no 
means the sole instance of controversially changing medical cri-
teria that affect the determination of who is disabled. Another 
well-known and influential product of this kind of process is the 
fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).234 This re-
cent revision eliminates the independent identification of the con-
figuration of symptoms previously diagnosed as Asperger’s syn-
drome, assigning the diagnosis based on these symptoms to the 
more general “autism spectrum” label.235 Some contend this 
change leaves high-functioning individuals without a diagnosis 
because autism is associated with serious functional deficit.236 
Others predict that individuals previously diagnosed with Asper-
ger’s, but denied services because that condition is associated 
with the potential for high functioning, will become eligible for all 
services offered for autistic people.237 Similarly, a DSM-5 change 
 
 234 See Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 364–70 (cited in note 108) (exploring the 
DSM’s role in creating diagnoses, including noting that “[t]he Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders . . . provides a window into how the creation of diagnoses is 
both politically and economically driven. The DSM plays a critical gatekeeping role in de-
termining which mental illnesses are valid for insurance and clinical purposes”). See gen-
erally Herb Kutchins and Stuart A. Kirk, Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible 
and the Creation of Mental Disorders (The Free Press 1997). 
 235 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition, DSM–5, 299.00 (5th ed 2013). 
 236 See Amy S.F. Lutz, You Do Not Have Asperger’s: What Psychiatry’s New Diagnostic 
Manual Means for People on the Autism Spectrum, Slate Medical Examiner (Slate May 22, 
2013), online at http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2013 
/05/autism_spectrum_diagnoses_the_dsm_5_eliminates_asperger_s_and_pdd_nos.html 
(visited May 21, 2014).  
 237 See American Psychiatric Association, News Release, DSM-5 Proposed Criteria for 
Autism Spectrum Disorder Designed to Provide More Accurate Diagnosis and Treatment 
(Jan 20, 2012), online at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/12-03%20Autism%20Spectrum 
%20Disorders%20-%20DSM5.pdf (visited May 21, 2014) (announcing the proposed 
changes).  
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that permits diagnosing unremitting sadness occasioned by be-
reavement as depression, even when the loss is only two weeks 
old, raises prospects of increased numbers deemed in need of 
health care, such as prescriptions of mood-altering medication.238 
Did courts that relied on DSM-IV239 definitions to decide whether 
plaintiffs satisfied the ADA’s standards make factual mistakes, 
or are determinations of disability mere transitory products of 
their times? How effective can protection against disability dis-
crimination be when the scope of disability status is so shifty? 
Pregnancy is another health condition in which the kind of 
disability determination demanded by benefits programs does not 
easily align with the objectives of a nondiscrimination program. 
In general, courts have held that pregnant women are not deserv-
ing of benefits meant to support those too disabled to work, pri-
marily because being pregnant is natural and temporary.240 But 
should such reasoning be permitted to deny workplace accommo-
dation that is specifically aimed at keeping individuals in atypical 
health states employed, especially as pregnant workers may rely 
on employee health benefits as the sole support for their children? 
The answer remains a matter of controversy.241 
There are early indications that interpreting pregnancy as a 
nondisability may continue under the ADAAA.242 Some courts are 
interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978243 to 
 
 238 Professor Allen Frances, chairman of the task force that created DSM-IV, has led 
the criticism of the fifth edition. See Allen Frances, Good Grief, NY Times WK9 (Aug 15, 
2010) (“This would be a wholesale medicalization of normal emotion, and it would result 
in the overdiagnosis and overtreatment of people who would do just fine if left alone to 
grieve with family and friends, as people always have.”). For a general discussion of this 
issue, see Benedict Carey, Grief Could Join List of Disorders, NY Times A1 (Jan 25, 2012). 
See also Ronald Pies, How the DSM-5 Got Grief, Bereavement Right (Psych Central May 
31, 2013), online at http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2013/05/31/how-the-dsm-5-got 
-grief-bereavement-right (visited May 21, 2014). 
 239 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM–IV–TR) (4th ed 2000). 
 240 See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 53 BC L Rev 443, 445–47 (2012). 
 241 See, for example, Christina Wilkie, Workplace Pregnancy Bill Introduced despite 
Opposition, Huff Post Business (Huffington Post Sept 26, 2012), online at http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/2012/09/25/workplace-pregnancy-bill-opposition_n_1914062.html (visited 
May 21, 2014) (“The Republican-controlled House has consistently opposed workplace bills 
like [the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act], which they argue place an unnecessary burden 
on businesses, lowering overall profits. The Senate is similarly inclined.”). 
 242 See, for example, Nayak v St Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc, 2013 WL 
121838, *2–3 (SD Ind) (ruling that the plaintiff was disabled, but only because her infir-
mities had lasted for eight months of the pregnancy and continued afterwards). 
 243 Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2076, codified at 42 USC § 2000e(k).  
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preempt the field, precluding application of an analysis based on 
disability discrimination.244 Even this reasoning, however, is 
problematic if it precludes the possibility that the bodily differ-
ences associated with pregnancy can be the basis for accommoda-
tions.245 
A further notable illustration of the confusion that accompa-
nies efforts to identify disability is the adoption of different disa-
bility definitions by federal agencies with different missions. For 
example, the US Census Bureau starts with the ADA’s standard, 
but for individuals at least sixteen years old expands the defini-
tion to include anyone unable to perform any of a long list of eve-
ryday tasks, including housework.246 To take another example, 
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development identi-
fies disability with “physical, mental, or emotional impairment 
that: (A) [i]s expected to be of long, continued, and indefinite du-
ration, (B) [s]ubstantially impedes the ability to live inde-
pendently, and (C) [i]s of such a nature” that could be improved 
by more suitable housing conditions.247 
These and other manifestations of the transience of disability 
identifications248 suggest there is no stable basis for the view that 
being disabled is exceptional. Planners charged with implement-
ing public programs that offer opportunities that are based on dis-
ability status thus cannot reliably project numbers of future re-
cipients who will qualify as worthy. Additionally, the instability 
of disability identification invites precipitous policy-directed 
shifts in how diagnoses should weigh. For example, in 1984 Con-
gress directed the Social Security Administration (SSA) to com-
pensate for pain and discomfort and to give the judgments of ap-
plicants’ physicians greater deference in determining eligibility 
 
 244 See Young v United Parcel Service, Inc, 707 F3d 437, 445–46 (4th Cir 2013) (“A 
claim of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy must be analyzed in the same manner 
as any other sex discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII.”), quoting DeJarnette 
v Corning Inc, 133 F3d 293, 297 (4th Cir 1998). 
 245 Young, 707 F3d at 446–67. 
 246 Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010 Household Economic Studies 
3 (Census Bureau July 2012), online at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf 
(visited May 21, 2014) (listing a limitation “in the kind or amount of housework” as a 
“nonsevere” type of disability). 
 247 24 CFR § 5.403 (2013) (defining what constitutes a “[p]erson with disabilities” for 
public housing assistance determinations). See also 42 USC § 423(d) (defining “disability”). 
 248 See Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 368 (cited in note 108) (exploring the transi-
ence of certain conditions, such as eating disorders, that “exist or have existed only at 
certain times and in certain places”). 
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for disability benefits.249 Moreover, applicants with nonsevere 
conditions could qualify as disabled if they suffer from several 
such conditions.250 As a result of this diffusion of the definitional 
line, the number of individuals qualifying as sufficiently disabled 
for social security benefits expanded.251 There are other manipu-
lations of such a line that might shrink the size of the eligible 
population, but the reasons for such possible changes cannot in-
clude approximating the number of objectively worthy individu-
als.252 
The SSA’s process for approving disability benefits also raises 
doubts about disability identification being cost-effective and fair. 
As the meaning of disability evolves, benefits approval has be-
come more and more adversarial.253 The percentage of awards 
made on the basis of appeals has doubled since the late 1970s.254 
About 40 percent of awards involve appeals, making their initial 
denial appear unfair.255 And while such gatekeeping practices are 
intended to keep costs down, instead of inflating them, claimants’ 
attorneys’ fees cost the SSA nearly half a billion dollars in 1997.256 
Setting a high bar against accommodation claims promises an 
 
 249 Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 § 3(a)(1), Pub L No 98-460, 
98 Stat 1794, 1799, codified at 42 USC § 423(d)(5). 
 250 42 USC § 423(d)(2)(B) (requiring that “the Commissioner of Social Security shall 
consider the combined effect of all of the individual’s impairments without regard to 
whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of [sufficient] severity”); 
20 CFR §§ 404.1526(b)(3), 416.926(b)(3) (stating that if a claimant has “a combination of 
impairments,” none of which is a listed impairment, the SSA will determine if the combi-
nation is of “equal medical significance” and may find that the combination is “medically 
equivalent” to a listed impairment). 
 251 See Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Secu-
rity Disability Insurance Program, 2011, SSA Publication No 13-11826, 12 (July 2012) 
(showing that in 1984 the number of disabled beneficiaries began a significant rise for the 
first time in seven years). 
 252 See generally, for example, Richard J. Pierce Jr, What Should We Do about Social 
Security Disability Appeals? Administrative Law Judges, Overruling SSA Rejections of 
Disability Claims, Contribute Heavily to Federal Spending, 34 Regulation 34 (2011) (sug-
gesting that the doubling of the proportion of the US population deemed to be permanently 
disabled over the past forty years is due primarily to subjective review by SSA’s Adminis-
trative Law Judges). 
 253 See, for example, Jennifer J. Dickinson, Comment, Square Pegs, Round Holes, and 
the Myth of Misapplication: Issue Exhaustion and the Social Security Disability Benefits 
Process, 49 Emory L J 957, 964–65 (2000) (describing the claims process and observing 
that “lawyers and representatives are taking an increasingly active role in vigorously ad-
vocating on behalf of disability claimants”). 
 254 See Pierce, 34 Regulation at 36 (cited in note 252) (stating that the grant rate of 
Administrative Law Judges in particular has doubled since 1970). 
 255 See Autor and Duggan, Supporting Work at 12 (cited in note 82). 
 256 See David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Dis-
ability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J Econ Persp 71, 88 (Summer 2006). 
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even more factious process, as not only the specific state of the 
claimant’s health and functional potential, but details of the 
work, the workplace, and the employer’s financial and labor situ-
ations, all must be weighed in judging whether a disputed accom-
modation is both reasonable and warranted. 
The SSA erects barriers to accommodations and thus steers 
many away from work.257 In Cleveland v Policy Management Sys-
tems Corp,258 the Supreme Court decided that being work disabled 
for social security disability insurance purposes could be compat-
ible with being able, with workplace accommodation, to execute 
the essential components of a particular job.259 The Court reck-
oned that the administrative resources of the SSA could not rise 
to the demands of determining disputed reasonable-accommoda-
tion issues, as these might turn on workplace-specific matters.260 
Therefore, the Court declared an employer’s obligation not to dis-
criminate by refusing workplace accommodation is not voided by 
the employee’s filing for SSA disability benefits.261 
B. The Compensatory-Benefit Model of Accommodation 
Even if the tension between being disabled under the ADA 
and being disabled for SSA purposes does not rise to contradic-
tion, as in Cleveland, modeling eligibility for reasonable accom-
modations on compensatory-benefits-sector procedures remains 
problematic. Such analogizing suggests that workplace accommo-
dation is privileging and therefore that the effect of such accom-
modations is to make the job easier for recipients suffering from 
debilitating health defects. Portraying accommodation in this 
 
 257 See notes 84–90 and accompanying text (explaining how the SSDI program dis-
courages impaired workers from remaining in the workforce). 
 258 526 US 795 (1999). 
 259 Id at 803 (holding that “an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform her 
job with reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim that 
the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs) without it”). 
 260 Id: 
[T]he SSA receives more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits each year; 
its administrative resources are limited; the matter of “reasonable accommoda-
tion” may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific matters; and an SSA mis-
judgment about that detailed, and often fact-specific matter would deprive a se-
riously disabled person of the critical financial support the statute seeks to 
provide. 
 261 Id at 804 (explaining that “an individual might qualify for SSDI under the SSA’s 
administrative rules and yet, due to special individual circumstances, remain capable of 
‘perform[ing] the essential functions’ of her job”) (brackets in original). 
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way thus suggests that whoever is being accommodated has in-
sufficient capability to be on the job, which leads to the conun-
drum that to be deserving of accommodation at work is to be un-
deserving of being at work. 
Law and policy articulated in terms of “group rights” may 
strike people who are not in the recipient group as being privileg-
ing rather than equalizing.262 Such law and policy may be read—
or misread—as offering benefits to individuals who are made eli-
gible merely by being identified with the group and not because 
they are personally deserving. The route that has been tried for 
combating the perception about programs being privileging is the 
imposition of stringent criteria for group membership. 
In the case of the right to reasonable accommodation pro-
vided by the ADA, the initial and preeminent approach to control-
ling for privilege has been to impose a high bar for identification 
as a person with a disability. This seems to have been the strat-
egy, modeled on the procedure for SSA benefits, that courts were 
inclined to adopt in order to determine eligibility for accommoda-
tion. Yet there is a fundamental difference: SSA benefits are de-
signed to enable people to leave the workforce, whereas accommo-
dations allow people to remain in the workforce. Courts in the 
wake of the ADAAA may be interpreting actual disability more 
expansively, but as Part III explained, echoes of the earlier ap-
proach appear to be reappearing in the areas of qualifications, 
causation, and in relation to “regarded as” disability (in which ac-
commodations are not available at all). 
The saga of Casey Martin, the golf pro who sought golf cart 
transportation to accommodate a mobility impairment, illus-
trates the mistaken tendency to presume that accommodation is 
about making work easier for the disabled.263 Martin, a skilled 
 
 262 See, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommoda-
tion, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va L Rev 825, 862–63 (2003) (discuss-
ing and disagreeing with various criticisms of the ADA that identify the Act as a “redis-
tributive scheme” aimed at privileging the disabled). See generally Silvers, 8 J Gender 
Race & Just at 581–83 (cited in note 31). 
 263 See PGA Tour, Inc v Martin, 532 US 661, 682–90 (2001) (ruling against the PGA’s 
claim that providing Martin with a cart would “fundamentally alter” the game and possi-
bly provide Martin with an unfair advantage). See also Pistorius v International Associa-
tion of Athletics Federations, CAS 2008/A/1480 13 (Ct of Arb for Sport 2008) (reinstating 
Oscar Pistorius’s eligibility for international competitions). See also generally Sarah J. 
Wild, Comment, On Equal Footing: Does Accommodating Athletes with Disabilities De-
stroy the Competitive Playing Field or Level It?, 37 Pepperdine L Rev 1347 (2010) (discuss-
ing both cases in a broad context of disability accommodations in professional sports); 
Alexis Chappell, Comment, Running Down a Dream: Oscar Pistorius, Prosthetic Devices, 
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golfer with a painful circulation disorder, sought to use a golf cart 
in PGA competitions—a means he had been permitted to use in 
many other golf competitions. It took the Supreme Court, which 
included experienced golfers, to turn back the idea that riding be-
tween holes makes it easier to execute the essential components 
of the game of golf.264 
Cutting the provision of reasonable workplace accommoda-
tion loose from the health-related services and the benefits mod-
els would dampen suspicions that accommodating workers’ func-
tional differences is privileging. To be justified under our 
proposal, a reasonable accommodation would need to be “effec-
tive,” in that accommodation enables the accommodated individ-
ual, who otherwise could not do so, to meet the same standards 
as others doing the job. Thus, a workplace or work-mode altera-
tion that merely makes executing work tasks easier for the recip-
ient than for others doing the same job would not be justified be-
cause the objective is not to benefit the worker but to meet the 
competency expectations for the work. Part V will explain our pro-
posal for accommodating every body in further detail. 
V.  ACCOMMODATING EVERY BODY 
This Article proposes to predicate provision of accommoda-
tions on their effectiveness in elevating functionality, instead of 
on recipients’ group-identity status. An effectiveness standard 
would be satisfied if the accommodation were needed by an indi-
vidual to fulfill the same essential job functions required of oth-
ers, but would not be satisfied if the accommodation served only 
to make performing those same essential functions easier than for 
other people. An “effectiveness” criterion is notable because a sim-
ilar approach was taken by Judge Richard Posner in an early 
ADA case265 but later rejected by the Supreme Court in Barnett.266 
The principle is also significant because it would mitigate the all-
 
and the Unknown Future of Athletes with Disabilities in the Olympic Games, 10 NC J L & 
Tech 16 (2008) (discussing Pistorius’s struggles for eligibility in international running 
competitions). 
 264 Martin, 532 US at 687 (incorporating the district court’s findings that “the fatigue 
from walking during one of petitioner’s 4-day tournaments cannot be deemed significant”). 
 265 See Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F3d 538, 543 (7th 
Cir 1995) (stating that “[t]he employee must show that the accommodation is reasonable 
in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs”). 
 266 Barnett, 535 US at 400 (finding that “a demand for an effective accommodation 
could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow 
employees”). 
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or-nothing approach continued by the ADAAA in which persons 
“regarded as” disabled, yet not functionally limited enough to sat-
isfy the definition of “actual disability,” are barred from receiving 
workplace accommodations.267 Instead, accommodations would 
benefit all individuals for whom workplace alterations enable the 
performance of essential job functions or provide opportunity that 
would otherwise not exist. 
One might question how the efficacy of an accommodation 
would be proven or defended. We recognize that establishing 
counterfactual claims—what would or will happen rather than 
what has happened—calls for some degree of epistemic sophisti-
cation.268 As an initial matter, plaintiffs could be placed under a 
prima facie burden to demonstrate that the proposed accommo-
dation would be effective but, as required under current law, not 
present an undue hardship. Several approaches to establishing 
an accommodation’s effectiveness suggest themselves. 
One avenue to establishing efficacy might be to show that the 
accommodation removes a needless or obvious barrier, for in-
stance maintaining a sufficiently wide and clear path of travel in 
a corridor for individuals who have erratic balance or use mobil-
ity-assistive devices.269 Another means could be through noting 
the accommodation’s alignment with existing laws and regula-
tions. That approach would have aptly accommodated Milton 
Ash, the second plaintiff before the Court in Garrett, a prison 
guard who was allergic to smoke and who worked in an area of 
the penitentiary where smoking was illegal.270 An additional way 
of showing the feasibility of a desired accommodation is to request 
an accommodation that is viewed as standard in the workplace, 
and not tied to particular individuals or group members, like a 
 
 267 42 USC §§ 12102, 12201(h). 
 268 For evidence establishing hypothetical and counterfactual claims, see generally 
Ernest Sosa, Hypothetical Reasoning, 64 J Phil 293 (1967); Stephen Barker, Counterfac-
tuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation, 108 Mind 427 (1999); Bence Nanay, 
Neither Moralists, nor Scientists: We Are Counterfactually Reasoning Animals, 33 Behav 
& Brain Sciences 347 (2010). See also generally John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul, 
eds, Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT 2004).  
 269 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Technical Assistance Manual: 
Title I of the ADA § 3.10(1) (Jan 1992), online at http://askjan.org/links/ADAtam1.html#III 
(visited May 21, 2014) (listing a number of examples in which simple changes to the phys-
ical workplace would be considered reasonable). 
 270 Garrett, 531 US at 362. 
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screen reader or an amended work schedule.271 The counterbal-
ance for the employer is that if the reasonable accommodation is 
made, employees are implicitly agreeing that employers can fire 
them as being not capable if they cannot function adequately uti-
lizing the agreed-upon workplace emendations.272 
The denial of an accommodation request, which itself arises 
as part of an interactive discussion with a current or potential 
employee, would constitute discrimination under our proposal—
much as it does under the ADA.273 This is because the employer, 
by rebuttable inference, is construing the individual who requests 
this accommodation as being incapable of performing the job, or 
incapable of performing the job without creating a risk to others 
or him- or herself, despite the provision of any reasonable accom-
modation (whether said accommodation is proposed by the em-
ployee or suggested in response by the employer).274 Here, lan-
guage from the recently released California Fair Employment and 
Housing Agency’s regulations on employment may be useful in 
limiting the employer’s affirmative defense to proving “there is no 
reasonable accommodation that would allow” the plaintiff to 
safely perform the job in question.275 
Under our proposal, an employer would need to feel very cer-
tain that a suggested accommodation would not work to deny it, 
with the result that the focus would shift squarely onto the em-
ployer’s act. Consider, for example, an airline copilot who has to 
test tires, but has light-sensitive skin and therefore wears a burka 
to protect herself. The airline states that she cannot do so because 
people will think her a terrorist or cannot readily identify her, and 
in consequence fires her rather than working through a job ac-
commodation such as switching the tire testing duties for another 
safety check. Or consider a trolley car driver with rigid contact 
lenses prescribed for keratoconus. Her employer dismisses her on 
the ground that the lenses will pop out and she will be without 
 
 271 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Questions and Answers (May 2002), online at http://www.ada.gov/q%26aeng02.htm (vis-
ited May 21, 2014) (listing “modifying work schedules” and “providing qualified readers or 
interpreters” as some of the common accommodations employees may need). 
 272 In ADA terms, the plaintiff is conceding that he or she is not a qualified individual 
with a disability, since that standard is defined as being able, with or without a reasonable 
accommodation, to perform essential job functions. 42 USC § 12111(8). 
 273 42 USC § 12112(b)(5). 
 274 42 USC § 12112. See also 29 CFR § 1630.9 (enforcing the ADA’s requirement of 
providing reasonable accommodations). 
 275 Cal Code Reg § 7293.8(b). 
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vision as the trolley trundles rapidly downhill, rather than inves-
tigating the likelihood of that occurrence or mandating that the 
employee wear glasses. In both of these hypothetical cases, the 
focus would shift from the employee’s ability to the employer’s act. 
Shifting the scrutiny from defining presumptive victims to 
explicating disability discrimination is crucial because, while 
there are certain types of people who historically have been sub-
jected to discrimination more than others, anyone could be. For 
example, women have historically been the primary targets of 
sex-based discrimination, but sex-based discrimination is of 
course in no way exclusive to them.276 Indeed, the prohibition of 
sex discrimination has evolved substantially, and beyond the 
view that only individuals with certain sex assignments are pro-
tected.277 This evolution has been in part the result of courts com-
ing to realize the complexities of sex assignment, which has been 
prompted to some degree by broad changes in society.278 
Disability assignment is at least as complex and socially rel-
ative as sex assignment.279 But disability assignment is also quite 
different, in that it bears heavily on various health and welfare 
administrative regimes. This is notable since the health-services 
and compensatory-benefits models do not serve civil rights pur-
poses280 and cannot provide a firm foundation for agreement about 
who is disabled and should be protected.281 Moreover, and much 
 
 276 See notes 58–70 and accompanying text. 
 277 See, for example, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 462 US 669, 675–76 (1983) (holding employer’s health plan im-
permissibly discriminated against men based on their sex). 
 278 See generally Eskridge, 57 UCLA L Rev 1333 (cited in note 58) (providing a broad 
historical examination of the correlation between law and gender roles); Mary Anne C. 
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the 
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L J 1, 37–41 (1995) (noting one legal innova-
tion in response to poststructural work on the gender/sex binary was four generations of 
sex-stereotyping jurisprudence, each of which was effectuated by a gradual expansion of 
Title VII to protect various permutations of gender and sex). 
 279 See Silvers and Stein, 35 U Mich J L Ref at 91–94 (cited in note 36). 
 280 See Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement at 
18 (cited in note 44) (noting the prevalent approach to disability in the 1970s focused on 
“medical treatment, physical rehabilitation, charity, and public assistance” and that disa-
bility activists believed such a view encouraged “dependence on doctors, rehabilitation 
professionals, and charity”). The structural dependence that issues from focusing on 
health services or benefits is in tension with effectuating one’s civil rights. See id at 21–
22. 
 281 This lack of a firm foundation may issue from—among other things—the cultural 
transience of certain disabilities, the political or economic incentives for certain disabili-
ties, as well as general disagreement in diagnosing patients. See Areheart, 29 Yale L & 
Pol Rev at 368, 370 (cited in note 108) (examining the cultural transience of eating disor-
ders and age-related impairments); id at 364–67, 369–70 (explaining how political and 
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as in the case of sex, although it is true that people with certain 
kinds of chronic illnesses or age-related conditions are more sub-
ject than others to disability-based discrimination,282 in principle 
it can happen to anyone, especially since one’s mental and physi-
cal abilities naturally change over the course of a lifetime. Anyone 
may thus be in position to need an accommodation to stay in the 
workplace. Trenchantly, shifting the locus of inquiry onto those 
who cause discrimination has been an effective method of getting 
to the root of undesirable workplace practices. This has been the 
case, most notably, for sexual harassment, in which the burden is 
now on employers and their personnel and workplace environ-
ments rather than on the particular qualities or actions of vic-
tims.283 
This brings us to the challenge of defining disability discrim-
ination. Part of the challenge under the employment provisions of 
the ADA was created by the statutory structure that requires 
plaintiffs, as a threshold issue, to first prove their eligibility for 
protection.284 In consequence, courts have concentrated in great 
degree on the question of eligibility, often failing to reach the 
question of disability discrimination.285 By contrast, other identity 
 
economic incentives may result in the creation or elimination of certain diagnoses); id at 
372 (noting studies in which psychiatrists trained in using the DSM cannot reach agree-
ment on diagnoses). 
 282 See Erin Ziaja, Do Independent and Assisted Living Communities Violate the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 9 Elder L J 313, 314–
15 (2001) (explaining the regularity of discrimination against the 52.5 percent of the el-
derly population with one or more disabilities). Diabetes is an illness that seems to gener-
ate many ADA decisions, which may suggest that diabetics are particularly subject to dis-
crimination. See, for example, Rohr v Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and 
Power District, 555 F3d 850, 858, 860 (9th Cir 2009) (surveying numerous cases applying 
the ADA to discrimination claims brought by diabetic employees). 
 283 See Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775, 805 (1998); Burlington Industries, 
Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742, 764–65 (1998) (requiring employers to show that they exercised 
“reasonable care” in avoiding harassment and that the employee failed to take advantage 
of the provided safeguards). See also Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering through the Laby-
rinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment—A Proposed Way Out, 67 Fordham L Rev 1517, 1538–58 (1999) (examining the 
standards for imposing and avoiding employer liability for sexual harassment). 
 284 42 USC § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination only against “qualified individ-
ual[s]”); 42 USC § 12111(8) (defining a “qualified individual”). See generally Chai R. Feld-
blum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-discrimination Law: What Happened? 
Why? And What Can We Do about It?, 21 Berkeley J Empl & Lab L 91, 139–41 (2000) 
(explaining how courts have thwarted the intent of the ADA’s drafters by misapplying the 
disability definition).  
 285 See, for example, Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 221 (cited in note 119) (“Because such 
cases are dismissed on the threshold issue of coverage, the question of whether discrimi-
nation actually occurred is never addressed.”). 
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groups—and especially those protected under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964—have been held to showing only that the discrimination 
practiced against them arose because of their protected cate-
gory.286 Moreover, Title VII plaintiffs have over time managed to 
evolve the jurisprudence to now include progressive doctrines 
such as sexual harassment,287 unconscious bias,288 and statistical 
discrimination289—even under the auspices of a conservative Su-
preme Court.290 
Perhaps the differences in how “sex” is covered under Title 
VII and how “disability” is covered under the ADA stem in part 
from one way in which sex coverage has grown increasingly so-
phisticated: by recognizing the performative nature of identity.291 
The coverage of sexual stereotyping and gender nonconformance 
under the category of sex implies that how we perform our per-
ceived sex-related roles has real-world consequences. Title VII ju-
risprudence has moved beyond a focus on static bodies to appre-
ciate that identity is performative such that no matter one’s sex, 
 
 286 42 USC § 2000e–2. For example, if an otherwise-qualified female job applicant 
sues her employer, there will be a presumption of sex discrimination to overcome at the 
summary judgment stage. Alternatively, the same prospective employee with a disability 
will find it difficult to survive summary judgment due to the presumption of her incompe-
tence. Silvers and Stein, 35 U Mich J L Ref at 122–23 (cited in note 36). See also Ruth 
Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 Ohio St L J 239, 
252–53 (2001) (comparing the success rates of ADA and Title VII appellants and finding 
that “Title VII plaintiffs fare much better”). 
 287 See, for example, Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 22 (1993) (upholding 
plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim under Title VII despite a lack of serious subjective 
harm); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66–67 (1986) (recognizing sexual 
harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII).  
 288 See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 432 (1971) (concluding that 
Title VII liability does not require intentional discrimination); Desert Palace, Inc v Costa, 
539 US 90, 101–02 (2003) (holding that “direct evidence of discrimination is not required 
in mixed-motive” Title VII claims). See also generally Melissa Hart, Subjective Deci-
sionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala L Rev 741 (2005) (examining uncon-
scious bias in Title VII decisions). 
 289 See, for example, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 
324, 339 (1977), quoting Mayor of the City of Philadelphia v Educational Equality League, 
415 US 605, 620 (1974) (stating that “‘[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue 
to serve an important role’ in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed 
issue”) (brackets in original); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 805 (1973) 
(finding statistics relevant in establishing a pattern of discrimination). 
 290 See Anita Silvers, Michael E. Waterstone, and Michael Ashley Stein, Disability 
and Employment Discrimination at the Rehnquist Court, 75 Miss L J 945, 972 (2006) (“The 
Rehnquist Court has taken the lead amongst the federal courts in treating disability dis-
crimination claims as being of a fundamentally different stripe than those on the basis of 
race or gender.”). 
 291 See Part I.B. See also Franklin, 67 Fordham L Rev at 1357–58 (cited in note 283). 
05 STEIN_ART_FLIP (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2014  11:11 AM 
2014] Accommodating Every Body 743 
 
one may experience discrimination or harassment simply due to 
gender, or the way in which sex-related roles are performed. 
In the same way, our proposal’s focus on accommodations un-
derscores the way in which ability is performative and not inexo-
rably tied to bodies. In particular, every workplace is designed to 
accommodate some types of bodies; it is the way in which one’s 
abilities are performed that dictates whether a person’s body is, 
in effect, accommodated. The ADA was premised on the value of 
access and enacted in part to allow more workers more oppor-
tunity to perform work effectively. Yet, while courts have implic-
itly accepted the idea of sex identity as performative by extending 
coverage to all sorts of permutations between sex and gender, 
courts have been less apt to accept the idea of ability being largely 
contingent on the structuring of the workplace. In particular, 
there has been a reluctance to force much structural change. 
“[T]he idea of a body constituted by its environment has exceeded 
mainstream legal norms”—at least mainstream disability law.292 
International jurisprudence on disability discrimination is 
instructive regarding one way to focus more on how ability is 
demonstrated. International disability law has increasingly 
sought, as a broad goal, to reduce vulnerability to discrimination 
that targets deficits of body or mind.293 This approach first as-
sesses the reasonableness of an accommodation’s effectiveness, 
with the goal of increasing labor market participation. This can 
be seen in a number of statutory provisions, including that of Hol-
land.294 Non-US courts rarely spend time on whether individuals 
with particular limitations or conditions fit the disability classifi-
cation and instead focus on eliminating systemic stigmatization 
of people with disabilities. For instance, in Archibald v Fife Coun-
cil,295 the House of Lords noted in a cursory manner that Mrs. 
 
 292 Kathryn Abrams, Performing Interdependence: Judith Butler and Sunaura Taylor 
in The Examined Life, 21 Colum J Gender & L 72, 75–76 (2011). See also Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in Linda Hamilton Krieger, ed, Backlash against the ADA: 
Reinterpreting Disability Rights 340, 340 (Michigan 2003) (observing that the ADA may 
have experienced backlash because it “got too far ahead of most people’s ability to under-
stand the social and moral vision on which it was premised”). 
 293 See generally Dagmar Schiek, Lisa Waddington, and Mark Bell, eds, Cases, Mate-
rials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-discrimination Law ch 
6 (Hart 2007) (comparing and contrasting the meaning of “reasonable accommodation” 
across various nations). 
 294 Schiek, Waddington, and Bell, Cases, Materials and Text at 658 (cited in note 293) 
(highlighting the duty “to make effective accommodations”), citing Dutch Act on Equal 
Treatment on the Grounds of Disability or Chronic Illness 2003, Art 2. 
 295 [2004] UKHL 32. 
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Archibald, a road sweeper, became disabled due to an operation 
and spent the remainder of the opinion on whether denying her 
application to over one hundred alternative and more sedentary 
positions constituted discrimination. The Lords concluded—tak-
ing a position directly opposite to the conclusion reached by the 
Supreme Court Justices in Barnett—that the Council of Fife 
should have accommodated her by allowing an exception to the 
prevailing seniority system.296 Non-US jurisprudence has now 
taken up the sophisticated civil rights conception of disability that 
Congress built into the ADA, but which American judges have left 
behind. 
VI.  THE VALUE OF ACCOMMODATING EVERY BODY 
Our proposal reaches in principle to all work-capable individ-
uals, with vigilant effort expended on effective adaptation of 
workplace practices for those groups that have been historical tar-
gets of workforce discrimination, and equal alertness undertaken 
to prevent new breeds of bias from taking hold. This policy shift 
is necessary to retain and integrate workers and, in so doing, 
achieve democratic goals. Section A argues that integration is an 
overarching democratic value that moves beyond group-based 
identity theory, and that employment opportunity involves a 
spectrum, rather than a bright line, of abilities. Section B dis-
cusses the good likely to result from our proposal, which includes 
structural, expressive, economic, and hedonic benefits. 
A. Integrating the Work Capable 
Reasonable accommodation can be seen to be an instrument 
of integration. In a seminal article published during the period of 
time known as the civil rights era, Professor Jacobus tenBroek—
University of California professor and founder of the National 
Foundation of the Blind—described what he understood to be a 
new “policy of integrationism” applicable to people like himself, 
 
 296 Contrast Archibald, [2004] UKHL at 32 ¶ 16: 
[A] substantial number of adjustments to the normal procedures were made in 
Mrs Archibald’s case. Some of them involved positive discrimination in her fa-
vour, such as her automatic short listing for the available posts. This was within 
the scope of the duty, as it was necessary for the council to redress the position 
of disadvantage that she was in due to her disability. 
with Barnett, 535 US at 402–03 (stating that “it will ordinarily be unreasonable” to reas-
sign a disabled employee as an accommodation if such reassignment violates a seniority-
based hiring policy). 
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that is, to the disabled.297 It took nearly a quarter century for Con-
gress (through the ADA) to endorse tenBroek’s proposal that peo-
ple with disabilities should also be beneficiaries of federal inte-
gration policy.298 
In considering tenBroek’s liberating vision, it is helpful to 
note that despite naming the disabled as a target group for inte-
gration, tenBroek’s theory did not posit that any special group 
benefits should accrue to the members as a result of this policy.299 
As philosopher Elizabeth Anderson observes in her much-praised 
book The Imperative of Integration, the policy of integration calls 
for “full participation of members of salient social groups on terms 
of equality, cooperation, and mutual respect.”300 In other words, 
people’s group identifications affect how an integrated coopera-
tive scheme should be arranged, but affording such recognition to 
a group’s differences is not the same as privileging its members.301 
An integrated cooperative arrangement enables everyone to par-
ticipate fully, with each respecting all other participants. And as 
respecting others includes accepting who these others are, ac-
knowledging not only their mutual similarities but their diver-
gences as well, pursuit of integration also calls for constructing 
social practices that do not embed bias against various kinds of 
difference.302 Thus, practices focusing on a social group’s salient 
 
 297 See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of 
Torts, 54 Cal L Rev 841, 841–52 (1966) (arguing that integration of the disabled is “the 
policy of the nation” and suggesting tort innovations to effectuate the disabled people’s 
“right to live in the world”). 
 298 The ADA’s findings are centrally concerned with the societal exclusion of people 
with disabilities. ADA § 2, 104 Stat at 328, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101. See 
also ADA § 202, 104 Stat at 337, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12132 (defining “dis-
crimination” under Title II, in part, as being “excluded from participation in or [ ] denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity”). 
 299 See tenBroek, 54 Cal L Rev at 848–50 (cited in note 297) (noting that the rights of 
integrationism, or public access, “belong to all men”). 
 300 Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration 184 (Princeton 2010). 
 301 See id (discussing how integration requires “the construction of a superordinate 
group identity”). 
 302 Anderson discusses four stages of integration, which enable genuine acceptance of 
who others are over a period of time. These stages, while directed toward race, may also 
be of more general use: (1) formal desegregation, (2) spatial integration, (3) formal social 
integration, and (4) informal social integration. Formal desegregation consists of abolish-
ing, often through the use of law, formal barriers to integration. Spatial integration con-
sists of the common use of facilities and public spaces. Formal social integration consists 
of cooperation that is institutionally structured, and informal social integration consists 
of cooperation even without the structure of organizational roles. Id at 116–17. See also id 
at 183–84 (noting that “[t]he ideal of integration does not call for the elimination of group 
difference or group identity”). 
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differences for the purpose of facilitating its members’ full inte-
gration should not be viewed as special rights belonging to group 
members. But if not as special entitlements for groups, how 
should this kind of accommodation to achieve integration be 
viewed? 
Integration of the workforce is needed for full engagement in 
employment by members of groups such as elders and people with 
disabilities who traditionally have enjoyed neither respect as 
workers nor equal participation as cooperators in productive ar-
rangements. As Anderson points out, there are contingent cir-
cumstances that make achieving integration for some salient so-
cial groups stand in need of law or policy that acts affirmatively 
to address past or present prejudices, injuries, or deprivations.303 
Anderson delineates four models of affirmative acting: compensa-
tory, diversity, discrimination blocking, and integrative.304 While 
Anderson discusses the models in the context of race-based af-
firmative action, these same models map onto reasons why soci-
ety needs to readily provide workplace accommodations. Accom-
modations require potential cooperators to act affirmatively in 
order to remedy past social exclusion, increase cultural and epis-
temic diversity, counteract ongoing discrimination, and integrate 
social institutions.305 But accommodations, rightly construed, 
must have integration through productive functioning as a pri-
mary goal. 
Some accommodation is a form of affirmative redemptive ac-
tion. Such actions are focused on arrangements that liberate 
members of minorities from disadvantages caused by preferences 
for other kinds of people that prevailed in the past. This kind of 
accommodation is necessary to achieve integration when prior so-
cial choice has resulted in current exclusionary practice. For ex-
ample, increasing reliance on text rather than talk in business 
transactions has, in various eras in the past, driven individuals 
with visual impairments from work that formerly was theirs to 
do, just as increasing reliance on talk when telephoning replaced 
telegraphing had a similar outcome for hearing-impaired people. 
A quarter century ago, both public and private employers 
made the social choice to replace mainframe computing with 
 
 303 See Anderson, The Imperative of Integration at 148–53 (cited in note 300) (advo-
cating and describing an “integrative model” of affirmative action). 
 304 Id at 135–37. 
 305 See id (describing the four models of affirmative action). 
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desktop-level programs that enabled employees to execute secre-
tarial and research functions themselves.306 Visually impaired 
workers could participate and even benefit from this trend, but 
only if versions of the screen-reading software that gave them ac-
cess to the powers of computing could keep up with improved ver-
sions of office and statistical programs. And doing so required 
that screen-reading-software developers could gain access to the 
popular office- and statistical-package proprietary codes. In this 
matter, a remarkable turnabout of prevailing social choice was 
promoted by the political efforts of organizations of affected indi-
viduals, effected by progressive state governments, and energized 
by the fascination of programmers and other technological types 
with solving the challenges of voice output and input. Today, off-
the-shelf productivity software typically has enlargement and 
some voice output function built in. Providing employees with the 
special software needed for accessible computing is thus a stand-
ard and paradigmatically reasonable accommodation.307 An em-
ployer’s doing so hardly seems privileging. That providing such 
access now appears to be a reasonable effort for employers to in-
tegrate visually impaired individuals into their workplaces is the 
result of just social choice having been embraced more than a dec-
ade ago. 
Affirmatively accommodating workers’ inability to read com-
puter screens is different than affirmative actions based only on 
broad group membership such as race or sex. Only individuals 
who cannot read a screen by looking at it would be accommodated 
by having screen-reading software, for only these individuals re-
quire such software to participate fully in activities for which 
computers are central. Screen-reading software merely enables 
visually impaired workers to access the text on a computer 
screensomething those who are not visually impaired already 
do by other means. 
Providing screen-reading software to people who cannot oth-
erwise read or access a computer screen is thus far from favoring 
 
 306 Valerie Reitman, PCs Replacing Mainframes in a New Computer Revolution: 
Many Firms Have Found That Personal Computers Are Cheaper, More Flexible, and as 
Powerful as Their Old Computers, Philadelphia Inquirer C1 (Sept 16, 1990). 
 307 “For blind and visually-impaired persons, reasonable accommodations may in-
clude adaptive hardware and software for computers, electronics [sic] visual aids, braille 
devices, talking calculators, magnifiers, audio recordings and brailled material.” Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, HR Rep No 101-485(II), 101st Cong, 2d Sess 64 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 346. 
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them. This accommodation may appear to be a group-based pref-
erence because it is bestowed on members of a salient group. But 
it is not their group membership that warrants the accommoda-
tion; the accommodation is instead warranted because it ad-
dresses a deficit that otherwise would prevent them, given pre-
vailing workplace practices, from doing the work, and because it 
enables them to do the work successfully. Increased workforce 
participation by a previously excluded group progresses person by 
person, and individual accommodations in the workforce consti-
tute piecemeal efforts by which the goal of full integration can be 
reached. Similarly, affirmatively responding to the kinds of or-
ganizational biases and barriers that have barred potential work-
ers from employment is often most effectively accomplished by al-
terations targeted to accommodate what otherwise would be a 
limitation that characterizes a group. 
Parenthetically, this feature of the kinds of groups for whom 
accommodation is a matter of justice explains why invoking the 
“access/content” distinction,308 which is supposed to distinguish 
equalizing accommodation from privileging favor, cannot exactly 
do that job. Effective accommodation must be narrowly tailored 
to whatever deficit, or divergence from the usual type of employee, 
the group’s members share, as well as to the group’s capacities for 
deploying alternative modes of functioning. Accommodating may 
mean providing instruments or arrangements differing from 
what other employees are given opportunity to use. But to affirm 
the goal of integration, and therefore accommodate rather than 
privilege, such an action must respond to what will effectively off-
set a deficit or difference so that members of the group do not suf-
fer being set aside. In other words, access requires appropriately 
tailored content. 
Redemptive action to enable execution of the job is not the 
only way in which accommodation facilitates integration. Another 
circumstance that calls for accommodation also combats discrim-
inatory exclusion, but in this case employers’ current preferences 
rather than past social choice constitute the source of the bar, and 
the remedy often is a matter of dispensing with rather than com-
pensating. Policies by which an employer manages a particular 
work site can prevent individuals who otherwise can execute a job 
from getting to or functioning at it. While formally neutral, such 
 
 308 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L J 1, 37 (2004) 
(naming and discussing the “access/content” distinction). 
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policies in practice are not at all substantively neutral.309 For ex-
ample, an individual with diabetes may need to keep an orange 
handy to remedy hypoglycemia and thus cannot do a full day’s 
work if the employer bans all food from workstations. Or an indi-
vidual with a walking deficit may not be able to mobilize from the 
part of a parking lot the employer has designated for workers of 
his rank or assignment, but be able to do so from a closer parking 
place provided for higher-ranking members of the organization. 
Thus, exempting employees from nonessential policies can be 
accommodating rather than privileging when such exceptions 
promote integration, that is, under conditions in which an indi-
vidual’s difference from typical employees would prevent that per-
son’s working were the usual work-site rule to be applied. Accom-
modating can be distinguished from privileging in cases like these 
by counterfactually hypothesizing whether the employer would 
retain the rule were all workers like the accommodation-needing 
one.310 If all workers were diabetic, an employer who failed to ar-
range for a means of rectifying insulin shock to be readily at hand 
could not remain in business, nor could an employer whose work-
ers all arrived at work exhausted because they had to walk from 
employee parking situated ten miles away. 
While the previous two approaches to accommodation ad-
dress the effects of bias by lowering job or work-site-specific bars 
that prevent potentially productive people from being allowed to 
work, a third approach promotes integration in another way. 
Here we find familiar tools for furthering diversity. These include 
not only recruitment programs aimed at full integration, but also 
training aimed at eliminating bullying, harassment, and other 
producers of chilling effects. 
B. Benefits of Accommodating Every Body 
Beyond the prudential and philosophical justifications set 
forth above, four types of value—structural, expressive, economic, 
and hedonic—would be increased by extending the right to mean-
ingful access through workplace accommodations to include all 
work-capable members of the population. 
 
 309 It is worth reemphasizing that a particularly problematic aspect of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence is the mistaken identification of policies as neutral that are not. See 
note 27 and accompanying text. 
 310 For an account of the “counterfactualizing” test in assessing the reasonableness of 
accommodation requests, see Silvers, Formal Justice at 129–31 (cited in note 26). 
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1. Structural benefits. 
Disability-rights advocates have long seen social impedi-
ments as primarily structural. In other words, it is the arrange-
ment of policies, norms, and workplace environments, and the be-
havior of people who implement and control such constructs, that 
exclude people from workplace opportunity.311 Accordingly, equal 
opportunity requires more than antidiscrimination protection, in-
cluding a legal right to accommodation, which currently exists 
only under relatively narrow circumstances. Genuine equal op-
portunity requires changing social structures and attitudes, so 
that people’s thoughtlessness and biases do not perpetuate sys-
temic exclusion. Challenging structural and attitudinal barriers 
is difficult and requires incremental progress, but is necessary to 
effectively “influence society towards a social norm of inclu-
sion.”312 For people with impairments, genuine equality of employ-
ment opportunity will require overcoming exclusionary structural 
impediments. 
Extending the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation mandate to 
all work-capable members of the general population with impair-
ments could enhance US employment practice by normalizing the 
process of considering workplace accommodation as a workplace-
productivity-enhancement tool. By eliminating the question of 
whether persons seeking accommodations are deserving of them 
(that is, whether they have an impairment that is considered se-
rious enough under the ADA), our proposal would change current 
workplace norms by encouraging employers to take accommoda-
tion requests more seriously and engage in good faith discussions 
about whether accommodations are warranted.313 In other words, 
enhancing the scope of liability for accommodation denial would 
induce employers to consider accommodation requests (including 
the requesting employee’s unique capabilities, job responsibili-
ties, and the relative burden of the request) more proactively and 
thoroughly. 
 
 311 See Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 350–52 (cited in note 108) (discussing the 
social model of disability and its emphasis on structural barriers). 
 312 Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 664 (cited in note 22). 
 313 This is consonant with the argument, advanced by some, that providing reasona-
ble accommodations for even those who are only “regarded as” having a disability enhances 
the benefits of the interactive process. See, for example, Austin Ozawa, Note, Reasonable 
Accommodation for Those “Regarded As” Disabled: Why Requiring It Will Create Positive 
Incentives for Employers, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 313, 346 (arguing that “increased poten-
tial liability for the employer encourages the employer to engage in the interactive pro-
cess”). 
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Of course, questions would remain as to whether the accom-
modation sought is reasonable—that is, whether it is effective 
and not an undue hardship for the employer. If more people seek 
accommodations and employers become less resistant to facilitat-
ing them, a more collaborative “interactive process,” as aspired to 
by the ADA and its regulatory agency,314 would result. Employers 
and employees would join together efficiently to adjust features of 
the job to help capable persons work, keep working, or otherwise 
optimize workplace productivity—all of these outcomes being re-
sults that avail management and worker alike. Such interactions 
are intrinsically beneficial since the more people interact proac-
tively, the more likely they are to be inclusive of—instead of 
thoughtless toward or subconsciously averse to—people with ac-
commodation needs.315 
Our proposal should also lead employers who value efficiency 
and innovation to prophylactically implement changes in policy 
so as to make the workplace more accessible for everyone. This 
could involve employers publicizing, and implementing standard 
protocols for, common accommodations such as work breaks, mod-
ified work schedules, modified job equipment, additional training, 
assistive software, or the provision of readers or interpreters. The 
proposal could also further facilitate the contemporary movement 
toward Universal Design, an architectural principle in which en-
vironments are designed to be “usable by all people to the greatest 
extent possible.”316 If employers anticipate having to make more 
accommodation-related changes to the workplace environment, 
they may be more apt to invest time and effort on the earlier “de-
sign” end to avoid subsequent needs to retrofit. These changes, 
taken together, could create organizational cultures in which 
making accommodation to achieve an inclusive workplace no 
 
 314 See 29 CFR § 1630.2(o)(3):  
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for 
the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified 
individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should 
identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential rea-
sonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 
 315 See Stewart J. Schwab and Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of 
Workplace Disabilities, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1197, 1258–59 (2003) (discussing the bene-
fits of “[a]ccommodation as procedure” and noting that even forced interactions may, over 
time, change employer preferences). See also, for example, Office of Technology Assess-
ment, US Congress, Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment, and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, OTA-BP-BBS-124, 80 (GPO 1994) (finding that contact increases tolerance and 
positive attitudes toward workers with psychosocial disabilities). 
 316 Mace, Hardie, and Place, Accessible Environments at 156 (cited in note 37). 
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longer is approached as a burden uniquely imposed by the ADA. 
Accommodations and making workplaces generally accessible as 
a matter of course could evolve into just another component of 
doing business, shedding the antiquated perception that ensuring 
employment opportunity for citizens with accommodation needs 
is an onerous imposition.317 
Such collective and institutional results, if realized, would 
stand in stark contrast to the current state of accommodation 
claims under the ADA. Claims for accommodation usually pro-
ceed in the following way: individuals advance individual claims 
and, when successful, those claims result in employers granting 
one-time exceptions to otherwise standard rules and policies.318 
There has been a dearth of collective action in this area, as dis-
parate impact and class actions predicated on absence of accom-
modation have been missing from ADA jurisprudence.319 Our pro-
posal would ameliorate the lack of collective action by 
incentivizing employers to initiate broad, structural changes to 
the workplace. There is thus the potential, under our proposal, to 
transform workplace environments cost-effectively by motivating 
employers to take preemptive action. 
2. Expressive benefits. 
Law does not merely control or constrain behavior; laws 
“mak[e] statements” and affect the way that people internalize 
certain values.320 Law thus has the capacity to change social 
norms. Promoting inclusion requires changing social mores and 
cultural attitudes so that attitudinal and institutional barriers do 
not perpetuate the exclusion of work-capable individuals who re-
quire accommodation. Detaching the right to accommodation 
from assignment of a special disability identity is consistent with 
integrating employees with disabilities rather than marking, and 
 
 317 Even under our proposal, only those accommodation costs that are “reasonable” 
would be remediable. 
 318 See Michael Ashley Stein and Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Im-
pact, and Class Actions, 56 Duke L J 861, 879–82 (2006) (discussing accommodation claims 
as “highly atomistic”). 
 319 Id at 882–84. 
 320 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa L Rev 2021, 2024–
25 (1996) (exploring “the function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling 
behavior directly”). See also Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 664–68 (cited in note 22) (discussing 
the expressive capacity of law). 
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perhaps stigmatizing, them as essentially different from most 
workers.321 
Accommodations are often seen as a net cost of hiring people 
with disabilities and thus irrational.322 Focusing ADA implemen-
tation on the effectiveness of accommodation as we propose would 
highlight both real costs and realized benefits of accommoda-
tions.323 Most accommodations are inexpensive or even costless 
and do not require expensive renovation or restructuring. Moreo-
ver, accommodations can yield residual benefits, such as “higher 
productivity, greater dedication, and better identification of qual-
ified candidates for promotion.”324 Decreasing the perception that 
it is disadvantageous to hire people with disabilities325 may reduce 
experiences of harassment, including remarks demeaning the in-
dividual’s condition, an allegation that frequently is an element 
of disability-discrimination complaints.326 
3. Economic benefits. 
Facilitating implementation of the ADA’s reasonable-accom-
modation mandate should have profound economic benefits. As 
explained above, there is a mounting economic crisis in the areas 
 
 321 For another example of how disabled persons may be rightly seen as having no 
essential difference, see Areheart, 29 Yale L & Pol Rev at 363–75 (cited in note 108) (ar-
guing through various concrete examples that disability is socially constructed). 
 322 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case against Em-
ployment Discrimination Laws 484–88 (Harvard 1992) (discussing various costs associ-
ated with enforcing disability protections in the workplace and concluding that “[t]he mis-
match of cost and benefit is a fatal flaw of any antidiscrimination law for the 
handicapped”). See also Areheart, 83 Ind L J at 190 (cited in note 119) (“[M]any people 
seem to view discrimination against disabled people as rational—the result of their own 
bodies’ deficiencies—and distinguishable from other forms of discrimination. The result is 
that even people who avoid other forms of discrimination may be apt to rationalize disa-
bility discrimination.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 477, 491 (2007) (noting that adverse reaction to the ADA 
is centrally about the fact that it “targets rational employer conduct”). 
 323 See Stein, 153 U Pa L Rev at 667–70 (cited in note 22) (employing an expressive-
law analysis of the ADA and discussing how the ADA plays a significant role in educating 
the public about people with disabilities). 
 324 Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 Iowa L Rev 1671, 1675 
(2000). 
 325 See Michael Ashley Stein, Book Review, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial 
Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 Va L Rev 1151, 1186–87 (2004) (observing that 
the ADA’s expressive value may tip an employer “from being a fence-sitter towards an 
inclusive equilibrium”). 
 326 See, for example, McBride v Amer Technology, Inc, 2013 WL 2541595, *1 (WD 
Tex); Wright v Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, 2013 WL 2014050, *9 (WD Tenn). 
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of Social Security, Medicare, and SSDI.327 The costs for these pub-
lic programs are unsustainable.328 Incautious pension programs 
will similarly fall prey to the fact that people are living longer, 
but not working and paying in enough to make up for the in-
creased costs. As older workers and their employers become fa-
miliarized with the idea of, and facilitated in achieving, effective 
workplace accommodation, individuals experiencing normal defi-
cits of aging should be better able to remain work qualified. And 
helping workers stay in the workforce as they age is a partial so-
lution for all of the public-benefit crises explained above.329 For 
example, empirical data show that receiving a workplace accom-
modation reduces the likelihood that someone will apply for SSDI 
benefits.330 Lowering the bar for securing an accommodation 
should thus decrease SSDI applications and expenditures. Help-
ing people stay in the workforce for more years should, in much 
the same way, support maintenance of the current Social Security 
and Medicare programs.331 
There are additional economic advantages for employers who 
embrace a nonadversarial accommodation process. Such employ-
ers stand to benefit from less sick leave used, fewer workers’ com-
pensation and other insurance claims, and “reduced post-injury 
rehabilitation costs.”332 These kinds of costs can be avoided, for 
example, by accommodating employees in danger of serious repet-
itive stress injury with voice-recognition technology before they 
are seriously impaired. 
4. Hedonic benefits. 
Though sometimes understated in discussions about employ-
ment discrimination, there are hedonic costs to both employers 
 
 327 See Part II.A. 
 328 See notes 76–79, 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 329 See notes 87–89 (explaining that part of the solution to rising dependency costs is 
to incentivize aging workers to keep working). 
 330 Richard V. Burkhauser, Lauren H. Nicholas, and Maximilian D. Schmeiser, The 
Importance of State Anti-discrimination Laws on Employer Accommodation and the Move-
ment of Their Employees onto Social Security Disability Insurance *5–6 (Michigan Retire-
ment Research Center Research Paper No 2011-251, Jan 2011), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961705 (visited May 21, 2014). 
 331 Increasing contributions to Medicare and Social Security or decreasing the associ-
ated costs are two ways to help with the mounting crises for these programs, and helping 
aging workers keep working assists with both. In particular, people working longer means 
they will contribute more and cost less. 
 332 Stein, 85 Iowa L Rev at 1675 (cited in note 324). 
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and employees that result from frustrated attempts to seek jus-
tice. Hedonic costs represent “an increase in negative emotions or 
a loss of positive emotions.”333 In the accommodation context, 
there are hedonic costs for employees who do not request accom-
modations (because they do not know about their rights or feel 
constrained by the employer not to make such a request), request 
accommodations and then feel their identity is under great scru-
tiny, or ultimately face an employer’s refusal to grant a reasona-
ble accommodation.334 Accordingly, to the extent that our proposal 
improves the current accommodations scheme for claimants or 
would-be claimants, there may be resulting hedonic benefits. 
To the extent that people who need an accommodation do not, 
under our proposal, have to feel as if they are advancing a unique 
adversarial request—but can instead see their request as some-
thing that national public policy now encourages for everyone—
they may feel less stigmatized. Unrestricting the scope of work-
place accommodations makes accommodations less stigmatic for 
all who seek them. Similarly, shifting the focus of the reasonable-
accommodation query from the eligibility of the individual to the 
effectiveness of the proposed response should be less marginaliz-
ing, in that people do not perceive (or are less likely to perceive) 
their identity as the object of scrutiny. If we can move toward a 
culture in which accommodations are commonplace, there should 
be far-reaching and significant destigmatizing effects for all peo-
ple with disabilities who work (whether they themselves need ac-
commodation or not). Additionally, to the extent some employees 
are laboring under the pressure and stress of requiring an accom-
modation but not even considering the possibility of requesting 
one, their quality of work life may improve substantially upon re-
ceipt of such an accommodation. Accommodations may also sig-
nificantly increase employees’ productivity or efficiency, which 
should concomitantly increase the satisfaction they derive from 
work. 
CONCLUSION 
Disability status has proven to be a poor proxy for identifying 
individuals with functional limitations whose work capability can 
 
 333 Emens, 94 Georgetown L J at 401 (cited in note 38). 
 334 Employers may also incur hedonic costs, which could result from employing and 
interacting with someone who has a disability. See id at 402. Such costs may be warranted, 
however, since antidiscrimination efforts such as the ADA are not envisioned as costless 
and “expressly envision[ ] employers absorbing some costs.” Id. 
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be realized by accommodations in the workplace. Congress 
adopted the ADAAA to refocus Title I implementation on the leg-
islation’s original employment-inspiring aspiration. The facility 
of the ADAAA, however, in inducing courts to intersect ideas of 
dysfunctional disabilities and serviceable work capabilities is at 
this point unclear. This Article has argued that focusing on the 
effectiveness of accommodations, rather than on the worthiness 
of individual employees to obtain such remedies, better serves the 
national interest of maintaining an optimally productive popula-
tion, and best supports democratic investment in equitable oppor-
tunity and integration of diverse people. 
 
